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The economic nexus standard has gained significant support during
the last decade as the proper standard for determining the scope of states'
taxing powers under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Unfortunately,
however, despite the widespread acceptance of that standard in the abstract,
there is no uniform understanding of what economic nexus actually means.
State courts that have adopted that standard have generally failed to explain
its parameters, and those few courts that have actually addressed the scope of
economic nexus have adopted artificially high standards that severely restrict
its reach. Actions by state legislatures and revenue authorities have been
much the same. Uncertainty reigns, yet those disparate approaches to the
same constitutional standard have yet to receive scholarly attention. This
Article seeks to fill that void by analyzing state actions in this area and by
evaluating how states' different formulations for economic nexus will likely
develop over time. Such an analysis shows that states' economic nexus
formulations have little theoretical or jurisprudential grounding and will
necessarily change and deteriorate over time. As a result, states' actions in
this area will be non-uniform and will maintain the significant uncertainty
that currently exists. Federal attention to economic nexus is thus warranted to
prevent state actions from undermining the goals of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. This Article analyzes several potential federal responses and
concludes that Congress should intervene and adopt a federal factor nexus
standard based on the Multistate Tax Commission's model formulation.
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"Our new constitution is now established, and has an appearance
that promises permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be
certain, except death and taxes! "'
1. INTRODUCTION
Ben Franklin's observation about the inevitability of death and taxes
is likely known by most. We understand that individuals can attempt to cheat
both for short periods of time, but few have illusions of winning the battle
altogether. Upon venturing into the corporate world, however, the rules
change. Perpetual existence is likely a birthright for a firm.2 Further, while
federal taxation tends to follow any domestic profits, a corporation's
obligations regarding state taxation are much less certain. Contrary to Mr.
Franklin's declaration, firms may find that they can generate significant
income on which they are not forced to suffer the burden of state taxation.
Such firms' benefactor on this front is the Dormant Commerce Clause and its
limitations on state taxing power.
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state can only tax a
business that has a "substantial nexus" within it.3 If a business's presence in
a state falls short of that standard, the state simply lacks the jurisdiction to
compel the business to pay its tax. But what is a substantial nexus? How is it
generated?
When evaluating state sales and use taxes, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the substantial nexus requirement can only be met where
1. Benjamin Franklin. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le
Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in Memoirs of Benjamin Franklin 619 (1834).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (2012) (providing a default
rule of perpetual existence for corporations formed under Delaware law).
3. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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a taxpayer has a physical presence in the taxing state. The Court has
remained silent, however, as to whether this physical presence rule is limited
only to those taxes or whether it applies to state business activity taxes, such
as corporate income taxes, as well.5 In the absence of guidance from the
Court, commentators have widely lauded an economic nexus standard' as the
appropriate standard for business activity tax purposes.7 That standard allows
states to tax businesses that do not have a physical presence within their
boundaries as long as those businesses have sufficient economic contacts
with the state. For example, imagine a software company that has all of its
employees, offices, and physical assets located in California. Due to
aggressive marketing on the Internet, the business has secured several
lucrative contracts with companies in New Jersey. Under an economic nexus
standard, New Jersey could tax that business based on its economic
connection to the state regardless of its distant physical footprint. Such
taxation would not be permissible under a physical presence rule.
Academic support of the economic nexus standard has focused
almost exclusively on its permissibility under the Dormant Commerce
4. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311-13 (1992); Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Rev. of Ill., 386 U.S 753 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
5. "Business activity taxes" refer to taxes that are not transaction based, like
sales taxes, but rather are measured by net income, profits, or receipts. They include
income taxes, franchise taxes, gross receipts taxes, and business and occupation
taxes, among others. The discussion in this Article applies equally to all types of
business activity taxes.
6. The use of the term "standard" here does not necessarily imply a
subjective standard rather than a rule (although that issue is discussed later herein).
The term "standard" in this context merely refers to which economic nexus "test"
should govern, whether expressed as a rule or as a standard. For a summary of the
conceptual difference between rules and standards and for a good sample of the
literature in this area, see Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97
VA. L. REv. 1, 15-20 (2011).
7. See, e.g., Christina R. Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and
Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 942-47
(1995) [hereinafter Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence]; Michael T. Fatale,
Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property and the State
Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407, 447-52 (1995); Michael T. Fatale,
State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical "Physical Presence" Constitutional
Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105 (2000); Craig J. Langstraat & Emily S. Lemmon,
Economic Nexus: Legislative Presumption or Legitimate Proposition?, 14 AKRON
TAx J. 1 (1999); John D. Snethen & Andrew A. Swain, Paying Their Fair Share:
The Hidden Lessons of Complete Auto and Quill, 46 ST. TAX NOTEs 749 (December
11, 2007); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and
Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 373-93 (2003) [hereinafter
Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective].
2012]
Florida Tax Review
Clause. Only limited attention has been given to defining what economic
nexus actually means. This limited attention has resulted in a range of
proposals - from a heightened qualitative formulation that requires
significant economic exploitation,8 to a formulation that requires only
minimal levels of economic contact,9 to a federal quantitative standard.' °
What is missing from the literature, however, is a significant discussion
about how individual states have defined economic nexus and whether those
state definitions are suitable or sustainable.1"
This Article fills that gap by providing a comprehensive review of
states' actions regarding economic nexus and by evaluating how their
different formulations will likely evolve over time. Such a discussion will
show that state authority regarding economic nexus largely follows the
academic literature. That is, state courts evaluating economic nexus have
focused nearly all of their energies on justifying their support of that
standard. They have given almost no attention to determining what economic
nexus means.1 2 Further, even where states have adopted particular
formulations, they have not acted uniformly. States' formulations have taken
both qualitative and quantitative forms, and within those forms, significant
variations already exist. This Article shows that those variations will
continue and that states' current economic nexus formulations will ultimately
suffer from significant erosion.
In light of these problems, a federal economic nexus standard is
warranted. Without federal action, the great variety and instability of state
formulations will create impermissible burdens on interstate commerce,
regardless of the impact of any one formulation. Although such intervention
would certainly weaken state taxing autonomy and could be challenged on
8. Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 7.
9. Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7.
10. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in
the Digital Age, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1287, 1295-97 (2000) [hereinafter McLure,
Implementing].
11. But see Julie Roman Lackner, Note, The Evolution and Future of
Substantial Nexus in State Taxation of Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1387
(2007) (providing a limited overview of the variety of state judicial economic nexus
formulations at the time). This note provides a good positive analysis of the various
judicial formulations that had been announced through 2007, but further work is
obviously required. This Article thus discusses the additional judicial standards that
have been adopted since that time, reviews the states' legislative approaches to
economic nexus, analyzes how those judicial and legislative approaches will develop
over time, and provides a normative assessment of economic nexus.
12. Further, the few economic nexus formulations that states have adopted
have yet to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, which has maintained indifference
towards this issue for nearly twenty years. See infra Part II.B.1 (listing a series of
economic nexus cases in which the Supreme Court has denied certiorari).
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federalism grounds, it would infringe on state authority in a way that is
limited to the federal interests underlying the Commerce Clause. Federal
regulation in this area would intervene at a jurisdictional level and would
leave states free to adopt varying substantive taxing structures to serve their
local interests.
This Article offers and evaluates four potential approaches for a
federal economic nexus standard and concludes that the best option -
considering both tax and constitutional policy - is for Congress to adopt a
quantitative standard based on the Multistate Tax Commission's model
formulation. That approach would provide bright-line guidance, comport
with normative tax principles, and provide adequate constitutional protection
for interstate commerce.
To form the groundwork for that proposal, Part II of this Article
provides a history of the economic nexus standard, from Supreme Court
authority to state judicial and legislative actions. Part III then evaluates how
states' current economic nexus formulations will likely evolve without
federal intervention. Part IV analyzes four potential federal approaches to the
economic nexus standard and determines that Congress should adopt a
federal factor nexus standard. Part V briefly concludes.
II. THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC NEXUS
The "nexus" concept in state taxation has a long and detailed history.
However, the modem era of nexus can be traced to the United States
Supreme Court's 1977 enunciation of a four-part test for evaluating state
taxes under the Dormant Commerce Clause in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.13 For a tax to be upheld under that test, it must: (1) be "applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state;' 14 (2) be "fairly
apportioned;" (3) "not discriminate against interstate commerce;" and (4) be
"fairly related" to the benefits afforded to the taxpayer by the state. 15 In turn,
the concept of economic nexus has developed under the first prong of
Complete Auto, which explicitly sets forth a "substantial nexus" requirement.
Interestingly, the only real guidance that the Court has provided
regarding the substantial nexus requirement has involved use tax collection
13. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
14. Less than one month after Complete Auto, the Court clarified that this
substantial nexus requirement necessitates only a nexus between the taxing state and
the taxpayer (or tax collector in the case of a use tax collected by an out-of-state
merchant), not the particular activity being taxed. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd.
of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977).
15. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279, 287. Of course, the Complete Auto
Court did not create this four-factor test out of whole cloth but simply joined the




obligations rather than direct impositions of tax. A use tax is complementary
to a state's sales tax. Whereas sales taxes are generally imposed on retail
transactions that occur within a state, use taxes are imposed on the use or
consumption of taxable property within a state. 16 Such taxes are designed to
compensate states for the tax revenues that are lost when taxpayers make
purchases without paying sales tax.' 7 This occurs, for example, when a
person buys an item online - or in a neighboring state - without paying
sales tax.18 Absent a use tax on that person's use of the goods in his or her
home state, the person would avoid paying any sales or use tax on that
purchase merely by making the purchase online (or across the border).
The principal problem for states with use taxes has been collecting
them. It is not practical - or politically expedient - for states to take
enforcement actions against individual consumers for small sums.' 9 States
have thus responded by imposing use tax collection obligations on certain
out-of-state vendors (e.g., catalog or internet businesses). Those vendors
naturally resist those obligations, often arguing that those requirements
violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
The Court upheld one state's collection obligations against those
challenges less than one month after Complete Auto.2 ° In that case, the
National Geographic Society argued that the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses barred California from requiring it to collect a use tax on sales to
California customers because its mail-order business did not have any
physical connection to the state.2' The Court rejected that challenge because
one of the Society's other business lines -within the same legal entity -
did have a physical presence in California.22 The Court did not evaluate the
case under Complete Auto's substantial nexus prong, but it did hold that the
16. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION 12.01 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2010) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION].
17.Id. 16.01[2].
18. Residents of Iowa, for example, can travel to Minnesota to purchase
clothing, which is exempt from Minnesota sales tax. MINN. STAT. § 297A.67, subd.
8 (2012).
19. States have attempted to encourage voluntary compliance with their use
taxes by putting use-tax remittance lines on their income tax returns. See Nina
Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns, 36 ST. TAX NOTES 25 (July 2,
2012) (evidencing that twenty-five states currently provide for use-tax reporting on
their states' individual income tax returns). Voluntary compliance in those states
appears to be low. Id. at 26 (showing that the percentage of income tax returns that
actually report use tax due ranges from 0.2 percent to 9.8 percent).
20. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560
(1977).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 562.
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Society's "continuous presence in California ... provides a sufficient nexus
to justify the State's imposition" 23 of use taxes. That physical presence
analysis was consistent with the Court's pre-Complete Auto decision in
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, which
explicitly recognized a physical presence rule under both the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses. 2
4
National Bellas Hess also involved a use-tax collection obligation
imposed on a remote vendor. In that case, however, the vendor did not have a
physical presence in the taxing state. The Court found that factor to be
determinative in upholding the vendor's challenge, noting the "sharp
distinction . . . between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or
property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with
customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general
interstate business.,
25
Fifteen years after Complete Auto the Court was presented with
another of these cases in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.26 The State of
North Dakota's unilateral determination that National Bellas Hess was no
longer valid law and its adoption of a statute that imposed a use-tax
collection obligation on out-of-state vendors that merely advertised in the
state precipitated this case.27 Quill challenged the tax-collection obligation as
a violation of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. The Quill Court
made two very important determinations with respect to the substantial nexus
prong of Complete Auto.
First, the Court recognized that its Due Process jurisprudence since
National Bellas Hess had abandoned a bright-line physical presence rule in
favor of a minimum contacts standard.28 The Court thus determined to extend
29that lower threshold to its Due Process Clause analyses of state tax statutes.
The Quill Court's second important determination was to retain its more
exacting physical presence standard for purposes of the Commerce Clause.3 °
23. Id.
24. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Rev. of Ill., 386 U.S 753, 758 (1967).
25. Id.
26. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Quill's physical presence in the state was limited
to a few floppy diskettes over which it retained title. Id. at 315 n.8.
27. Id. at 302-04.
28. Id. at 307 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). The Court recognized that the Due Process inquiry was satisfied if the out-
of-state actor "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the benefits of an economic market in
the forum state" regardless of the actor's physical presence there. Id.
29. Id. at 308.
30. The Court noted that it might not have adopted this test had it been
asked to do so for the first time in that case but that its determination was not
inconsistent with Complete Auto. Id. at 311. Further, the Court acknowledged that it
had applied the physical presence test after Complete Auto (in Nat'l Geographic). Id.
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The combination of those two decisions operated to create a "gap"
between the protections afforded to taxpayers under these two constitutional
provisions. The Court justified this disconnect by discussing the difference in
their purposes:
Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.
The two standards are animated by different constitutional
concerns and policies.
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of
governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the
due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an
individual's connections with a State are substantial enough
to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him. We
have, therefore, often identified "notice" or "fair warning" as
the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. In
contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement
are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the
individual defendant as by structural concerns about the
effects of state regulation on the national economy. Under
the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered
and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended
the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills. It is
in this light that we have interpreted the negative implication
of the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we have ruled that
that Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate
commerce ... and bars state regulations that unduly burden
interstate commerce ....
The Complete Auto analysis reflects these concerns
about the national economy. The second and third parts of
that analysis, which require fair apportionment and
nondiscrimination, prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of
the tax burden onto interstate commerce. The first and fourth
The Court then proceeded to defend the physical presence test on several grounds,
including stare decisis. For a complete discussion of Quill and its reasoning for
upholding the physical presence test, see Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, supra note 7, at 328-29. For a discussion supporting Quill's ongoing
validity as a positive matter, see Adam B. Thimmesch, The Fading Bright Line of
Physical Presence: Did KFC Corporation v. Iowa Department of Revenue Give
States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100 KY. L.J. 339 (2012) [hereinafter
Thimmesch, The Fading Bright Line].
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prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship
between the tax and state-provided services, limit the reach
of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation
does not unduly burden interstate commerce. Thus, the
"substantial nexus" requirement is not, like due process'
"minimum contacts" requirement, a proxy for notice, but
rather a means for limiting state burdens on interstate
commerce. Accordingly, contrary to the State's suggestion, a
corporation may have the "minimum contacts" with a taxing
State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the
"substantial nexus" with that State as required by the
Commerce Clause. 31
This discussion is of paramount importance when analyzing nexus
cases under the "substantial nexus" requirement of Complete Auto. The
Court made it very clear that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses protect
different interests and that a taxpayer's actions in a state could
constitutionally satisfy the former without satisfying the latter.
Quill represents the Court's last guidance regarding the jurisdictional
limitations reflected in the substantial nexus prong of Complete Auto.
However, despite the Court's affirmation of the physical presence rule, there
has been considerable conflict regarding whether this rule applies to taxes
other than sales and use taxes. That debate has been aided principally by the
tone and language of Quill, which indicates a less-than-enthusiastic
adherence to the rule.32 Indeed, the Quill Court explicitly stated that it had
not, "in [its] review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical
presence requirement" and that it may not have adopted such a test if it were
being offered as a matter of first impression.33 Consequently, taxpayers and
state revenue authorities have debated whether - for purposes of taxes other
than sales and use taxes - a taxpayer must have a physical presence in a
state or whether an "economic" presence suffices.3 4
This Article does not attempt to address the underlying question of
whether Quill compels a physical presence test for all state taxes or whether
it should be limited to state sales and use taxes.35 Rather, this Article focuses
on the proper formulation for economic nexus once it is accepted as an
31. Quill, 5 04 U.S. at 3 12-13 (citations omitted).
32. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 6.02[2] (labeling
the Quill Court's affirmation of the physical presence test "almost apologetic").
33. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.
34. A discussion of state-court determinations on this issue is discussed in
Part II.B. 1.
35. A great amount of attention has already been given to this debate. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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appropriate standard under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Part II.A begins
this discussion by providing background on the economic nexus concept and
its place in the Court's nexus jurisprudence. Part II.B and II.C then provide
an overview of the various state judicial and legislative adoptions of
economic nexus.
A. A Conceptual and Jurisprudential Introduction to Economic Nexus
Before discussing how states have defined what economic nexus
means, it is important to understand the conceptual structure under which
nexus issues arise. Nexus, of course, refers to a person's connection with a
state and that state's concomitant power to impose a tax - or tax-collection
obligation - on that person. Walter Hellerstein has identified nexus as being
comprised of two elements: (1) substantive jurisdiction and (2) enforcement
jurisdiction.36 The former refers to a state's substantive connection with an
item of income, while the latter refers to the state's power over the
taxpayer.37
Substantive jurisdiction itself is considered to have two bases:
residence and source.38 Residence-based jurisdiction allows a state to tax the
income of persons who reside within the taxing state. 39 In contrast, source-
based jurisdiction gives a state jurisdiction over income that is attributable to
sources within the taxing state without regard to the residence of the
recipient.4° Substantive jurisdiction thus gives states power over the income
of nonresidents who economically exploit state markets. Of course, this
expanded reach over the income of non-residents raises questions regarding a
state's ability to actually collect the tax it imposes on that income. That
concern is encompassed by the concept of enforcement jurisdiction.
As indicated above, the boundaries of a state's enforcement
jurisdiction dictate the extent to which that state can collect tax on income
over which it has substantive jurisdiction. Under current law, states'
enforcement and substantive jurisdictions are not coterminous. Rather,
states' enforcement jurisdiction has been limited by both judicial41 and
36. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the
New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2003) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income].
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4; HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 6.03.
39. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920).
40. Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income, supra note 36, at 6-8.
41. The Quill physical presence test discussed above is an example of a
judicial limitation on enforcement action. Although a state may have substantive
jurisdiction over the income derived from a sale made to an in-state resident, the
state does not have enforcement jurisdiction over the remote vendor if that vendor
does not have a physical presence in the state.
[Viol. 13:4
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legislative 42 action. Thus, due to tax-specific jurisdictional rules, a state can
have jurisdiction over a taxpayer's income without actually having the ability
to require the taxpayer to remit the tax.43
With this framework in mind, Complete Auto reveals itself as
addressing both enforcement and substantive jurisdiction. First, the
requirement of nexus with the taxpayer under Complete Auto's substantial
nexus prong evidences a concern for the state's connection to that person
(i.e., its ability to enforce an assessment of tax - its enforcement
jurisdiction). Second, the requirement that income be fairly apportioned
under Complete Auto's second prong speaks to a particular state's right to tax
only the income that is fairly attributable to it. This test reflects a concern
that states have an underlying substantive right to the income being taxed -
in other words, substantive jurisdiction.44
Current debate regarding the efficacy and scope of economic nexus
occurs within the purview of an enforcement jurisdiction analysis or whether
a state has sufficient authority over the person to require its payment of tax
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (2012) (restricting state enforcement
power over taxpayers with only limited physical presence in a state) [hereinafter P.L.
86-272]. P.L. 86-272 was enacted by Congress after the Court's decision in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota. In that case, the Court
upheld the imposition of state income taxes on companies whose only presences in
the taxing states were in-state salespersons who solicited orders for fulfillment from
outside the states in which they solicited orders. Nw. States Portland Cement, 358
U.S. 450, 454-56, 465 (1959). Congress reacted swiftly to the decision and adopted
P.L. 86-272 within the year. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959); see
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 6.16. P.L. 86-272 limits states'
enforcement jurisdiction over remote vendors that sell tangible personal property and
that only have limited activities within their boundaries, including solicitation
activities. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a).
It is important to note at the outset of this Article that the discussion of
economic nexus here is limited to taxpayers that are not protected by P.L. 86-272.
Regardless of the proliferation and scope of economic nexus among the states, P.L.
86-272 limits its impact to those who do not fall within its protections. For a full
discussion of the scope and impact of P.L. 86-272, see HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION, supra note 16, 6.16-6.18.
43. This disconnect can be remedied if the state has enforcement
jurisdiction over a third party who controls the out-of-state person's funds. For
example, a state can impose a withholding requirement on in-state persons who
make payments to out-of-state businesses that do not have a nexus with the state.
See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
44. Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce
Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REv. 109, 118-20 (2004); Swain, A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 328-29.
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(i.e., the substantial-nexus prong of Complete Auto).45 In this light, it is safe
to say that the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized economic
nexus as a legitimate basis for the imposition of a state business activity tax
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.46 This lack of direct guidance,
however, has not prevented states from arguing that the Supreme Court has
recognized the validity of economic nexus for purposes of enforcement
jurisdiction analyses.47 Two cases generally form the basis for such
arguments: New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves48 and International
Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation.49
Whitney involved a Due Process challenge to the imposition of New
York state income tax on gains received by an out-of-state taxpayer from the
sale of a fractional membership on the New York Stock Exchange.
50
Whitney's membership on the Exchange gave him rights to trade on the
Exchange and access to certain other benefits, including an insurance fund
and access to reduced commissions for transactions undertaken on his
behalf.5'
Whitney challenged the imposition of New York income tax on his
gains from the sale of his fractional membership as a violation of the Due
Process Clause, arguing that the membership did not have a business situs in
New York.52 The Supreme Court evaluated the rights to which Whitney's
membership entitled him and determined that the very nature of the asset was
that it was "localized" at the Exchange. 53 The Court noted that wherever the
45. This is not to say that the concept of economic nexus does not apply to
substantive jurisdiction. To the contrary, economic nexus is the heart of substantive
jurisdiction. That inquiry focuses solely on the source of income without regard for
presence of the income earner. Economic nexus for purposes of substantive
jurisdiction is thus on sound footing, so to speak. The discussion in this Article
therefore discusses economic nexus in the context of enforcement jurisdiction and
Complete Auto's substantial nexus requirement.
46. See Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at
328-29 (stating that "the Supreme Court has not directly answered the question of
whether mere economic presence is a sufficient ground for a state to assert its
income tax jurisdiction"). State courts have pointed to many Supreme Court
decisions to justify the adoption of economic nexus. However, for reasons discussed
below, those decisions are less than definitive with respect to the scope of states'
enforcement jurisdiction.
47. See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Iowa
2010); Kmart Prop., Inc. v. Tax'n and Rev. Dep't of N.M., 131 P.3d 27, 36 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2001); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 23 (S.C. 1993).
48. 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
49. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
50. Whitney, 299 U.S. at 367.
51. Id. at 370-71.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 372-73.
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owner of a membership right resides, "he must go to the Exchange to
exercise his privilege to trade upon its floor., 54 In turn, the Court held that
"the dominant attribute of relator's membership in the New York Stock
Exchange so links it to the situs of the Exchange as to localize it at that place
and hence bring it within the taxing power of New York.,
55
Whitney arguably provides support for an economic nexus standard
under the Commerce Clause.5 6 First, the Court upheld the New York income
tax based solely on its analysis of the business situs of Whitney's intangible
asset. That analysis rings of an economic nexus - rather than a physical
presence - analysis. Further, although Whitney involved a Due Process
challenge, the Court's Due Process standard for purposes of state taxation
had not yet been lowered pursuant to Quill.57 Whitney may therefore signal
how the Court would analyze an economic nexus dispute today.
Despite the foregoing, Whitney falls short of being dispositive on the
economic nexus inquiry for many reasons. First, the decision's singular focus
on the presence of an asset in the state suggests that the Court may have been
focused on a quasi in rem jurisdiction theory,58 which the Court later
rejected.59 Second, the Court's focus on a business situs analysis may
indicate that, even if economic nexus is accepted, it is bound by business-
situs analyses.60 Third, Whitney's membership in the New York Stock
Exchange could be likened to an interest in a pass-through entity, which can
61generate a physical presence for its owners where the entity operates.
Fourth, despite the recognition above - that then-current Due Process
analysis was similar to present-day Commerce Clause analysis - the
decision was a Due Process decision. Applying Whitney for Commerce
54. Id.
55. Whitney, 299 U.S. at 372-73.
56. For a discussion of those arguments, see Swain, A Jurisprudential and
Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 347-49.
57. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text; see also Swain, A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 347-49 (discussing how
Whitney could be instructive on this point).
58. Quasi in rem jurisdiction refers to a state's jurisdiction over a person's
property that is located in the state. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 689 (7th ed.
2000).
59. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977); Swain, A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 347-48.
60. Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 348.
61. Id.; see also Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73,
81 (111. App. Ct. 2000) ("Certainly, the physical presence in the taxing state of the
partnership that generates the income suffices as a physical presence of the
nonresident partner in the state.").
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Clause purposes can be problematic to the extent that the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses are focused on different concerns.62
Finally, Whitney could have been decided on physical presence
grounds. The Court has repeatedly recognized that the physical presence of a
taxpayer's agents can be attributed to the taxpayer so long as the activities of
the agents are "significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to
establish and maintain a market" in the taxing state. 63 In Whitney, the Court
explicitly noted that the taxpayer's right to trade on the market could only be
exercised by a member physically present at the Exchange.64 As a result, if
Whitney himself were not physically present in New York, to exercise his
right would have required the use of an agent acting on his behalf in the
state. Thus, Whitney appears to be as easily reconcilable with a physical
presence standard - with attribution principles - as with an economic
nexus standard.
International Harvester provides similarly mixed signals. That case
involved a challenge to the imposition of a Wisconsin tax on dividends paid
from a corporation doing business in the state. 65 Two shareholder-recipients
who had no personal connection to Wisconsin challenged the imposition of
the tax as a violation of the Due Process Clause.66 The tax was collected by
the state through a withholding obligation imposed on the corporation
67
making the distribution.
The appellants challenged the imposition of the tax on their dividend
distributions as a violation of the Due Process Clause because they had no
62. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
63. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249-
50 (1987) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123,
126 (Wash. 1986)); see also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1960).
For a full discussion of these "agency nexus" cases, see Mark Cowan, Tax Planning
Versus Business Strategy: The Rise and Fall of Entity Isolation in Sales and Use
Taxes, 44 IDAHo L. REv. 63, 93-109 (2007); Andrew Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-
Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 1803, 1811-13 (2012); John Swain, Cybertaxation
and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus, 75 S. CAL. L. REv.
419, 433-35 (2002); Thimmesch, The Fading Bright Line, supra note 30, at 345-48.
64. New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366, 373 (1937)
("Wherever the owner may reside he must go to the Exchange to exercise his
privilege to trade upon its floor. If he prefers to have his customers' orders executed
through other members, still they must execute these orders on the Exchange under
its rules.").
65. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Tax'n, 322 U.S. 435, 437-38
(1944). The Wisconsin tax at issue applied to the portion of a corporation's dividend
distribution that was attributable to the corporation's income earned in Wisconsin.
Id. at 438.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 437. Despite this mechanism for collecting the tax, the incidence
of the tax was on the shareholders. Id.
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connection with Wisconsin, nor were the dividends declared or paid from
within the state. 68 The Court rejected that challenge, 69 noting that "[p]ersonal
presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to the
constitutional levy of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation's
Wisconsin earnings as is distributed to them., 70 The Court went on to note
that "[a] state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly
attributable either to property located in the state or to events or transactions
which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation. ' 71
The International Harvester Court's analysis may seem to lend
credence to an economic nexus concept. The Court certainly was
unimpressed by the taxpayers' lack of physical connections to the taxing
state. However, several factors weigh against viewing this opinion as direct
support for economic nexus under Complete Auto's first prong. First, the
opinion seems to focus on substantive jurisdictional grounds rather than on
enforcement jurisdictional grounds.72 This is highlighted principally where
the court recognizes that "[s]o long as the earnings actually arise [in
Wisconsin] . . .the conditions of state power to tax are satisfied . . . even
though some practically effective device be necessary in order to enable the
state to collect its tax. 73 The latter portion of this statement speaks directly
to enforcement jurisdiction, a concern that was alleviated by the state's use
of a taxpayer with a physical presence in the state - the dividend issuer -
to collect the tax.74
The Court may have also inappropriately attributed the source of the
corporation's income (and its activities) directly to the shareholders - as in
the case of a flow-through entity. 75 That analysis would be inappropriate
because it would ignore the separate legal existence of the corporation. If
68. Id. at 439-40.
69. Id. at 445 ("We conclude that appellants' stockholders can have no
constitutional objection to the withholding by Wisconsin of a tax measured by their
dividends distributed from Wisconsin earnings.").
70. Id. at 441. The Court also noted that "the fact that the stockholder-
taxpayers never enter Wisconsin and are not represented in the Wisconsin legislature
cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction to tax." Id. at 443.
71. Id. at 441-42.
72. For a similar critique, see Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, supra note 7, at 350 (stating that "the opinion does not unequivocally
state that Wisconsin has jurisdiction over the stockholders and not merely
jurisdiction over their income").
73. Int'l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 443-44.
74. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 6.04 n.66
(recognizing the questions regarding enforcement jurisdiction presented by the Int'l
Harvester decision).
75. Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 350-
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accepted, however, such an analysis would be consistent with a physical
presence standard (i.e., the shareholders would have been physically present
through attribution).
Finally, one can limit the relevancy of International Harvester to the
economic nexus debate by limiting that case to its Due Process roots. (Recall
that the taxpayers in the case challenged the Wisconsin tax solely on that
ground.) In fact, the Court nearly compels this limitation with its clear
statement that its Due Process jurisprudence did not prohibit "unfair or
burdensome taxes, merely because they are unfair or burdensome.', 76 This
statement is in direct conflict with the Quill Court's declaration of the
purpose for the Commerce Clause's enforcement jurisdiction bar. As noted
above, the Quill Court characterized the substantial nexus prong of Complete
Auto as "limit[ing] the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that
state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce."7 7 The
International Harvester Court's express rejection of that concern undercuts
an extension of that case to the substantial nexus inquiry under the
Commerce Clause.
Beyond Whitney and International Harvester, Quill itself perhaps
can be viewed as supporting an economic nexus standard for purposes of
state business activity taxation. The Court's opinion in Quill explicitly (and
repeatedly) noted that it had not adopted a physical presence rule for the
purpose of evaluating impositions of taxes other than sales and use taxes. 8
The Court thus could be viewed as implying that an economic nexus
standard suffices for those purposes. The problem with relying on this
analysis, of course, is that the Court did not say that the standard was proper.
It only implied that it was.
As this discussion evidences, the Court's nexus jurisprudence may
provide some indirect support for an economic nexus standard for
enforcement jurisdiction purposes, but that support falls short of being
definitive on several grounds. As a result, it has fallen upon state courts and
state legislatures to determine the extent to which an economic nexus
satisfies Complete Auto's substantial nexus prong.
76. Int'l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 444.
77. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 296, 313 (1992) (emphasis
added).
78. Id. at 314 ("Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes,
articulated the same physical presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for
sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess
rule."); id. at 317 ("In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and
concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical
presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now
reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.").
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B. Economic Nexus as Adopted by State Courts
1. State Judicial Acceptance of the Economic Nexus Standard
The Supreme Court's lack of direction regarding economic nexus
has not prevented states from adopting that standard when analyzing the
imposition of state income taxes. Indeed, less than a year after the Quill
decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted the validity of the
economic nexus standard for income taxes in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission.79 The taxpayer in this case was an out-of-state
company (Geoffrey) whose only connection to the state was that it licensed
81intellectual property to a related entity (Toys-R-Us) operating in the state.
The state asserted that Geoffrey was subject to the state's tax because it
earned income from the use of its intellectual property in the state under its
licensing agreements with Toys-R-Us. Geoffrey challenged the imposition of
the tax as a violation of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that neither clause was
violated by the state's imposition of tax on Geoffrey. With respect to the Due
Process Clause, the court found that "Geoffrey purposefully directed its
activities towards South Carolina," that it had the required minimum
connection with the state, and that "South Carolina ha[d] conferred benefits
upon Geoffrey to which the challenged tax [was] rationally related.'
Turning to Geoffrey's Commerce Clause challenge, the court stated:
"[I]t is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical
presence in a state for income to be taxable there. 82 The court dismissed
Geoffrey's argument that Quill's physical presence standard applied by use
of a mere footnote, stating that the Quill decision itself had "noted that the
physical presence requirement had not been extended to other types of taxes
[beyond sales and use taxes]. 83 Geoffrey petitioned the Supreme Court to
review the case, but the Court denied the request.84
Geoffrey stands as the starting point for state assertions that an
economic nexus standard for income taxes is permissible after Quill.
79. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
80. Id. at 16-17.
81. Id. at 19-22.
82. Id. at 23. The Geoffrey court's sole supporting citation from the
Supreme Court was a reference to Int'l Harvester. Id. As discussed earlier, the South
Carolina court's reference is unsatisfactory for many reasons. See supra notes 65-77
and accompanying text.
83. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 23 n.4.
84. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Rev. & Tax'n, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). The
Geoffrey court's limited Commerce Clause analysis and subsequent determination
are subject to critique on several grounds. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION,
supra note 16, 6.11[2].
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Initially, however, other states were not overwhelmingly convinced that
Geoffrey was correct; in the next decade, many cases were decided on each
side of the issue. Courts in Illinois,8 5 New Mexico,
86 North Carolina,8 7
Ohio,88 and Washington 89 agreed with the South Carolina court and held that
Quill did not foreclose an economic nexus standard outside of sales and use
tax cases. In contrast, cases in Tennessee, 90 Texas, 91 and New Jersey92 held
that Quill prohibited the use of an economic nexus standard for state income
taxes.
State courts began to approve economic nexus standards with
increasing regularity and unity beginning in 2005. In June 2005, a West
Virginia circuit court determined that MBNA Bank, an out-of-state credit
card company, had a sufficient nexus with the state based merely upon its
solicitation of, and business with, West Virginia customers.93 The West
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this decision in 2006, and the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review the case in 2007. 94
The West Virginia experience played out almost simultaneously in
New Jersey. In 2005, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court held that an out-of-state intangible holding company had a nexus with
New Jersey for income tax purposes simply based upon its receipt of royalty
income from its related-party licensor in the state.95 The Supreme Court of
85. Borden Chems. & Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (I11. App. Ct.
2000).
86. Kmart Props., Inc. v. Tax'n & Rev. Dep't of N.M., 131 P.3d 27 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002), cert. dismissed, aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Kmart Corp. v. Tax'n & Rev. Dep't of N.M., 131 P.3d
22 (N.M. 2005).
87. A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
88. Couchot v. State Lottery Comm'n, 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996). The Couchot court expressed support for an economic
nexus standard, but the taxpayer in that case had a physical presence in the taxing
state. Id. The income at issue was lottery winnings from a ticket that the taxpayer
purchased and redeemed while physically present in Ohio. Id. at 1230-31.
89. Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002).
90. J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999).
91. Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. 2000).
92. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003),
cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007).
93. Tax Commissioner of W. Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 04-AA-
157, (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2005), aff'd, 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).
94. Tax Commisioner of W. Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d
226, 236 (W. Va. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007).




New Jersey affirmed that decision in 2006, and the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to review the case in 2007.96
In 2005, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals also held that no
physical presence was required under the Commerce Clause for the state to
impose its income tax on an out-of-state intangible-holding company.9 The
New Mexico Supreme Court followed that decision just six days later with
its rejection of the extension of the physical presence rule in Kmart
Corporation v. Taxation & Revenue Department of New Mexico, another
case involving an intangible-holding company structure.98
These developments that began in 2005 have set the stage for an
overwhelming state rejection of a physical presence test for purposes of state
income taxes. In addition to the above-referenced decisions, cases and
administrative rulings in Arizona, 99 Florida, °00  Indiana,' 0  Iowa,'1 2
Louisiana, 10 3 Massachusetts, 10 4 Missouri,'1 5 Ohio, 10 6 and Washington 0 7 have
96. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006), cert.
denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007). The New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated its
economic nexus holding in Praxair Tech., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 988 A.2d 92
(2009).
97. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Civ. App.
2005) (Geoffrey Okla.).
98. Kmart Corp. v. Tax'n & Rev. Dep't of N.M., 131 P.3d 22, 23 (N.M.
2005). For a discussion of the unique procedural history of the Kmart Corp. case, see
Walter Hellerstein, Green Light, Red Light, or Blue Light: New Mexico Supreme
Court Sends Mixed Signals With Kmart Decision, 39 ST. TAX NOTES 141 (Jan. 16,
2006).
99. Decision of Hearing Officer, No. 200700083-C, Ariz. Dep't of Rev.,
Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.azdor.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9ZY8i7xZVNE%
d&tabid=105&mid=474.
100. Fla. Technical Assistance Advisement 07C1-007 (Oct. 17, 2007),
https://taxlaw.state.fl.us/wordfiles/CIT%/20TAA%/ 2007C t-007.doe.
101. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Ind. Dep't of State Rev., 895 N.E.2d 140
(Ind. T.C. 2008) (ABNA Ind.).
102. KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010).
103. Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So. 2d 115 (La. Ct. App. 2008)
(Geoffrey La.).
104. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 2009),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2853 (2009) (Geoffrey Mass.); Capital One Bank v.
Commissioner of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 76 (2009), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2827 (Mass.
2009).
105. Acme Royalty, Co. v. Dir. of Rev., Case No. 99-2839 RI, 2002 WL
200921 (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm'n Jan. 3, 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 96
S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2002); Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Dir. of Rev., Case No. 99-2856
RI, 2002 WL 200918 (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm'n Jan. 3, 2002), rev'd on other
grounds, 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2002).
106. Couchot v. State Lottery Comm'n, 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996).
107. Lamtec Corp. v. Dep't of Rev., 246 P.3d 788 (Wash. 2011).
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all rejected the application of the physical presence test to taxes other than
sales and use taxes. State revenue authorities also indicate broad acceptance
of an economic nexus standard. 10 8 In contrast, only a few state courts have
held that a physical presence is required for taxes other than sales and use
taxes. '09 The great weight of the authority has thus rejected the application of
Quill outside of those taxes. As discussed below, however, states have varied
greatly in their explanation of the standard that applies in the absence of a
physical presence rule.
2. State Judicial Economic Nexus Formulations
Although state courts have readily accepted the validity of economic
nexus, they have given very little attention, if any, to what economic nexus
actually means." 0 Their decisions have focused almost exclusively on
justifying the adoption of that standard and the rejection of the physical
presence standard of Quill."' Many of those courts have simply found that
an economic nexus existed based on the particular facts presented without
explaining what standard they applied. For example, in cases involving
intangible-holding-company structures,' 12 many courts have stated only that
deriving income from licensing intangible property for use in the state is
sufficient to establish an economic nexus with the state." 3 Those cases do
108. See generally BNA 2012 State Tax Department Survey Results,
http://www.riacheckpoint.com (State & Local Tax Library).
109. See, e.g., Innova Diagnostics, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 166 S.W.3d 394 (Tex.
App. 2005); In re Wascana Energy Mktg. Inc., DTA No. 817866, 2002 WL 1726832
(N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 18, 2002); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18
S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. 2000); J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000).
110. This Article will take the opposite approach. While one can debate
whether state-court adoptions of an economic nexus concept are on firm footing, this
Article is aimed at evaluating the meaning of economic nexus. For writings
evaluating the former issue, see supra note 7.
111. See, e.g., MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Ind. Dep't of State Rev., 895
N.E.2d 140 (Ind. T.C. 2008); KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308,
324-28 (Iowa 2010); Capital One Bank v. Commissioner of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 76,
83-86 (Mass. 2009); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 908 A.2d 176, 176-77 (N.J.
2006); A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 193-95 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 132 P.3d 632, 635-38 (Okla. Civ. App.
2005); Tax Commissioner of W. Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226,
230-34 (W. Va. 2006).
112. For a description of the intangible holding company structure, see
Sheldon Laskin, Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing That Which Enriches, 22
AKRON TAx J. 1, 5-7 (2007) [hereinafter Laskin, Trademark Royalties].
113. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 87, 92 (Mass.
2009) ("[S]ubstantial nexus can be established where a taxpayer domiciled in one
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not discuss whether the first dollar of such income created that economic
nexus or whether some higher amount of income was required.
One line of cases does, however, provide an actual formulation for
economic nexus - a substantial economic presence standard. This standard
was first adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Tax Commissioner
of West Virginia v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., a case addressing the
taxation of MBNA America Bank, a Delaware corporation in the principal
business of issuing and servicing VISA and MasterCard credit cards.
14
MBNA solicited customers in West Virginia through mail and telephone
solicitations. 15 During the two tax years at issue, those efforts resulted in
gross receipts attributable to West Virginia customers of approximately $8.4
million and $10 million. 16 The West Virginia Tax Commissioner asserted
that MBNA was subject to the state's corporate income tax because it
regularly engaged in business in West Virginia. 17 MBNA challenged that
assertion, arguing that the Commerce Clause barred the state's imposition of
tax because MBNA did not have a physical presence in the state.
1 1 8
The MBNA W. Va. court carefully evaluated National Bellas Hess
and Quill and determined that their physical presence requirement applied
only to state sales and use taxes." 9 The court concluded that "[r]ather than a
physical presence standard . . . a significant economic presence test is a
better indicator of whether substantial nexus exists for Commerce Clause
purposes."' 120 The court cited to a 1995 article as "suggesting" this test and
providing its bounds:
State carries on business in another State through the licensing of its intangible
property that generates income from the taxpayer."); Kmart Props., Inc. v. N.M.
Tax'n & Rev. Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he use of KPI's
marks within New Mexico's economic market, for the purpose of generating
substantial income for KPI establishes a sufficient nexus"); A & F Trademark, 605
S.E.2d at 195 ("Rather, we hold that under facts such as there where a wholly-owned
subsidiary licenses trademarks to a related retail company operating stores located
within North Carolina, there exists a substantial nexus with the State sufficient to
satisfy the Commerce Clause."); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13,
18 (S.C. 1993) ("We hold that by licensing intangibles for use in this State and
deriving income from their use here, Geoffrey has a 'substantial nexus' within South
Carolina."); see also KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 328 ("We hold that, by licensing
franchises within Iowa, KFC has received the benefit of an orderly society within the
state and, as a result, is subject to the payment of income taxes that otherwise meet
the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
114. MBNA W. Va., 640 S.E.2d at 227.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 227-28.
117. Id. at 228.
118. Id.
119. MBNA W. Va., 640 S.E.2d at 232.
120. Id. at 234.
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According to this commentator, a substantial economic
presence standard incorporates due process purposeful
direction towards a state while examining the degree to
which a company has exploited a local market. Further, a
substantial economic presence analysis involves an
examination of both the quality and quantity of the
company's economic presence. Finally, under this test,
purposeful direction towards a state is analyzed as it is for
Due Process Clause purposes and the Commerce Clause
analysis requires the additional examination of the
frequency, quantity and systematic nature of a taxpayer's
economic contacts with a state.
12 1
The court in turn found this test "persuasive" and determined to apply it to
the case at hand.1
22
The taxpayer raised two principled objections to the adoption of an
economic nexus standard. It first argued that the court should apply a more
onerous nexus standard for purposes of direct taxes (i.e., income taxes) than
for purposes of indirect taxes (i.e., sales and use taxes). MBNA argued that
direct taxes create a greater burden on interstate commerce because they
require not only administrative efforts, but they also take money directly
from the corporate coffers. 123 Second, it argued that the adoption of a
substantial nexus requirement, which does not require a physical presence,
would be tantamount to adopting a Due Process minimum contacts
standard.
124
The court quickly disposed of MBNA's concerns. With respect to
MBNA's "burden" argument, the court relied on the National Bellas Hess
and Quill Courts' focus on the "substantial compliance burdens attached to
the collection of sales and use taxes."'' 25 The court then simply decided to
"reject MBNA's claim that the imposition of direct taxes is a greater burden
that the duty of collecting taxes."'
126
This reasoning is unsatisfying. The court made no attempt to
compare the burdens of sales and use tax compliance with those of state
income tax compliance. Perhaps the burdens of the former are more onerous
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 234. Of course, one can debate how different those are. The
burden of administrative efforts can be boiled down to the costs that they impose as
well.





than the latter, but the court did not undertake that analysis. Instead, the
court relied on the fact that the National Bellas Hess and Quill Courts
focused on sales and use taxes - an unsurprising focus given the issue
presented in those cases.
The court's reliance on that analysis also failed to take into account
the additional burdens of actually funding those taxes. Sales and use taxes
are collected from a customer, whereas income taxes must be paid from the
corporation's funds. As noted above, compliance burdens are not a unique
exaction. They are simply the cause for additional capital outlays. The
funding of a tax thus imposes the same type of burden on taxpayers as do
pure compliance costs, and that burden must be taken into account.
The court addressed MBNA's concerns about the convergence of the
Commerce and Due Process inquiries with similar brevity. The court simply
disagreed with MBNA's assertion and explained that the Commerce Clause
requires "that an entity's contacts with the taxing state be more frequent and
systematic in nature" and that a taxpayer's "exploitation of the market must
be greater in degree than under the Due Process standard so that its economic
presence can be characterized as significant or substantial." 27The court thus
expressed that "although a substantial economic presence standard is by
nature more elastic than the bright-line physical presence test, . . . when
properly applied, a greater nexus is required under the substantial economic
presence standard than under the minimum contacts analysis."' 128
After a relatively brief explanation of its new economic nexus
standard, the MBNA W Va. court gave an equally brief application of that
test. The court looked to both MBNA's activities directed at West Virginia
and its economic returns from those efforts. With respect to the former, the
court noted that MBNA had "continuously and systematically engaged in
direct mail and telephone solicitation and promotion in West Virginia.' ' 29
With respect to the latter, the court focused on MBNA's derivation of
revenue from West Virginia customers in amounts ranging from eight to ten
million dollars during the two years at issue. The court labeled those amounts
"significant gross receipts. 1 30 In sum, the court held that MBNA's
"systematic and continuous business activity in this State produced
significant gross receipts attributable to its West Virginia customers which
indicate[d] a significant and economic presence sufficient to meet the
substantial nexus prong of Complete Auto."''3
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. MBNA W Va., 640 S.E.2d at 235.




The MBNA W Va. analysis has been utilized, to one degree or
another, by a variety of courts since 2006.132 In Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., for
example, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana discussed the MBNA W. Va. case
and its significant economic presence test in the context of analyzing whether
Quill applied to the state's income tax. 133 After determining that Quill did not
so apply, the court made its economic nexus determination by focusing on
the taxpayer's licensing agreements with "eight to eleven stores in
Louisiana" and its receipt of "significant royalty income from the use of its
trademarks in th[e] state.' ' 34
In 2009, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave a similar
analysis in its decision in Capital One Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue.' 35
In the course of its examination of whether the physical presence rule applied
to the state tax at issue, the court discussed the MBNA W. Va. court's analysis
and found it to be "persuasive."'' 36 The court's limited economic nexus
analysis then focused on Capital One's lending activities in the state, its
solicitation and conduct of "significant" business with "hundreds of
thousands of Massachusetts residents," and its receipt of "millions of dollars
in income" from the state. 137 The court also expressly addressed the
relationship between its economic nexus standard and the Due Process
standard, stating that "[w]hile the concept of 'substantial nexus' is more
elastic than 'physical presence,' it plainly means a greater presence, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, than the minimum connection between a
State and a taxpayer that would satisfy a due process inquiry. Simply put, the
test is 'substantial' nexus, not 'minimal' nexus."'
38
132. Although none of those courts have explicitly adopted the MBNA W
Va. test, they have issued opinions that apply the same analysis.
133. Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So. 2d 115, 126-27 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
134. Id. at 126-28.
135. 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2009).
136. Id. at 86.
137. Id. The court also noted that the taxpayer had made use of the state's
Attorney General's office and court system. Id. at 86-87. The MBNA Ind. court also
looked to this factor in a footnote in its analysis. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Ind.
Dep't of State Rev., 895 N.E.2d 140, 144 n.4 (Ind. T.C. 2008) ("MBNA admits that
during the years at issue, it had pending in Indiana's court system debt collection
actions also exceeding a 'de minimis' number.").
138. Capital One Bank, 899 N.E.2d at 86; see also Kmart Props., Inc. v.
N.M. Tax'n & Rev. Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 36 ("Although Quill did establish that
'substantial nexus' under Complete Auto Transit has more than the minimum
contacts required of due process .. .we need not quantify that difference here.").
These courts' limited discussions provide a uniform interpretation of economic
nexus as a standard that is more exacting than the Supreme Court's Due Process
requirements. They fail, however, to provide any precise guidance on the quantum of
difference between the two.
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Other courts have provided similar analyses without specifically
mentioning the MBNA W Va. test. Those courts have focused on the
taxpayers' systematic and continuous solicitation in the taxing states and
their receipt of significant revenue from customers in those states without
explicitly setting forth any "test."'' 39 Those cases can be interpreted
consistently with the substantial economic presence test but still provide no
explicit guidance on what standard for economic nexus actually applies.
The import of this discussion is that most state courts adopting the
economic nexus standard have failed to provide any formulation for how that
test is to be applied. Additionally, those courts that have provided some
formulation have adopted heightened qualitative standards that require
"substantial" economic presences in their state. Those standards purposefully
require a market exploitation that is more significant than that required under
the Due Process Clause, but they provide little additional guidance on their
boundaries.
C. State Economic Nexus Legislation
State legislatures have been mindful of economic nexus, and many
have enacted (or retained) legislation that imposes a business activity tax on
out-of-state parties based simply on their economic contacts with the taxing
state.140 That economic nexus legislation has taken both qualitative and
quantitative forms.
1. Qualitative Economic Nexus Standards
States legislatures have adopted a variety of qualitative economic
nexus standards. Those standards reflect two distinct interpretations of
economic nexus. The first follows the MBNA W. Va. model and recognizes
economic nexus as a heightened jurisdictional bar on state taxation. The
second simply applies a pure substantive jurisdiction analysis, which looks
only to a taxpayer's derivation of revenue from sources within a state.
New Hampshire has adopted the former approach and imposes its
business profits tax on every organization "carrying on any business activity
139. See, e.g., MBNA Ind., 895 N.E.2d at 144 (looking at the regular
solicitation of business from Indiana customers and the receipt of "significant gross
receipts" from Indiana customers); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 899
N.E.2d 87, 93 (Mass. 2009) (focusing on the taxpayer's extensive contacts with
customers in the state and the annual royalty income that it received therefrom).
140. Undoubtedly, not all of the statutes discussed below were passed with
conscious thought towards the current economic nexus debate. However, as
discussed herein, many of the recent statutory enactments directly incorporate
standards from this debate.
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within the state.' 141 The term "business activity" is defined to mean "a
substantial economic presence evidenced by a purposeful direction of
business toward the state examined in light of the frequency, quantity, and
systematic nature of a business organization's economic contacts with the
state."' 142 This statute thus directly incorporates the MBNA W. Va. standard
for economic nexus. 1
43
The State of Connecticut has adopted a similar approach.
Connecticut General Statutes section 12-216a provides:
Any company that derives income from sources within this
state and that has a substantial economic presence within this
state, evidenced by a purposeful direction of business toward
this state, examined in light of the frequency, quantity and
systematic nature of a company's economic contacts with
this state, without regard to physical presence, and to the
extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States,
shall be liable for the tax imposed under this chapter.
144
This statute, like that adopted by New Hampshire, adopts the heightened
MBNA W Va. standard for economic nexus.
141
141. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-A:1(I), 77-A:2 (2012).
142. Id. § 77-A:l(XII). See also OR. ADMIN. R. 150-317.010(2) (2012)
(proving that substantial nexus exists with the state "where a taxpayer regularly takes
advantage of Oregon's economy to produce income for the taxpayer and may be
established through the significant economic presence of a taxpayer in the state.").
143. Despite this qualitative standard, New Hampshire does not require
corporations to file income tax returns in the state unless their "gross business
income" exceeds $50,000. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-A:6(I). This return-filing
threshold gives the look of a quantitative test, but it is implemented through an
administrative provision rather than a nexus provision. The threshold is also
significantly lower than other states' quantitative nexus thresholds, which are
discussed below.
144. See 2011 CoNN. PuB. ACTS 100, § 55 (June Spec. Sess.). Prior to this
legislation, Connecticut law imposed the state's corporate income tax on companies
that either derived income from the state or that had a substantial economic nexus in
the state. Id. Under that statute, the substantial economic nexus portion of the statute
was seemingly subsumed by the source prong of the state's disjunctive statute. The
apparent heightened AIBNA W Va. standard of the second prong was rendered
irrelevant by less exacting, source-based first prong.
145. The Connecticut Department of Revenue Services supplemented the
state's qualitative economic nexus provision with an Information Publication
indicating that a corporation will not be deemed to have an economic nexus with the
state if its activities have resulted in less than $500,000 of Connecticut sales during
the tax year. State of Connecticut Department of Revenue Services, Informational
Publication 2010(29.1) (Dec. 28, 2010), Q&A on Economic Nexus
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Other state statutes rely on source principles without requiring an
MBNA W. Va. level of contacts with their state. Kentucky, for example, has
defined "doing business" in the state to include "[d]eriving income from or
attributable to sources within this state" and "[d]irecting activities at
Kentucky customers for the purpose of selling them goods or services. 146
This formulation contains both source principles (deriving income from
sources in the state) and activity principles (directing activities at in-state
customers). This is similar to the approach adopted in Minnesota. Minnesota
Statutes section 290.015, subdivision 1(b) provides that a business is subject
to the state's income tax "if the trade or business obtains or regularly solicits
business from within this state, without regard to physical presence in this
state." This formulation contains the same two elements, imposing tax on
those who (1) obtain business from the state (a source concept) or (2)
regularly solicit business from the state (an activity concept). Many state
statutes adopt the same approach, 147 while some rely solely on source
concepts. 48 Regardless of the approach, however, these states' standards
accept that the simple derivation of revenue from a state is sufficient for the
imposition of the states' business activity taxes without an inquiry into the
level of that revenue or the level of the economic contacts that created those
returns. 1
4 9
The foregoing qualitative economic nexus formulations provide
three principal lessons. First, even among states that have adopted such
standards, there is significant variation in how they are structured. Second,
only formulations like those adopted in Connecticut and New Hampshire
(http://www.ct.gov/drs/lib/drs/publications/pubsip/20l0/ip2010-29.1 .pdf) [herein
after Connecticut, Q&A]. Although this standard appears to set up a purely
quantitative standard, the publication notes that taxpayers not meeting this threshold
can still be assessed tax under other nexus standards. Id.
146. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(25)(f)-(g) (West 2012). Of course,
this statute respects P.L. 86-272, providing that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be
interpreted in a manner that goes beyond the limitations imposed and protections
provided by the United States Constitution or Pub. L. No. 86-272." Id. §
141.010(25).
147. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-2(a)(3) (2012); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
43-102(A)(5) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-3 l(a) (2012); IOWA CODE § 422.33(1)
(2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 110(c) (2012); N.J. ADMiN. CODE § 18:7-1.6(a)(2)
(2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2A-3(A) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-530 (2012).
148. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-3-2-2(a)(5) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:31(3) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36 § 5102(6), (10) (2012); OR. ADMIN. R. §
150-318.020(2)(1) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-201(1) (West 2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-400 (2012).
149. A lack of case law analyzing the boundaries of these standards
suggests that states have not yet attempted to exercise their taxing powers to the full
extent allowed by their statutes.
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attempt to provide meaningful guidance on what actions constitute an
economic nexus. Third, many of those formulations allow the imposition of
tax based simply on source principles.
2. Quantitative Tests for Economic Nexus
Many states have eschewed qualitative economic nexus standards in
favor of purely quantitative rules. Those rules are generally based upon a
2002 model statute promulgated by the Multistate Tax Commission.'5" Under
that model legislation, a taxpayer has a sufficient nexus with a state if it has
more than (1) $50,000 of property; (2) $50,000 of payroll; (3) $500,000 of
sales; or (4) 25% of its total property, payroll, or sales in the state. 51
The model statute also provides for inflation adjustments to those
threshold amounts' 52 and provides model sourcing rules for determining the
property, payroll, and sales factors.153 Legislatures and revenue authorities in
California, 15 4  Colorado,'55  Michigan,'5 6  Ohio,'57  Oklahoma, 158  and
Washington 59 have adopted this factor nexus concept in some form. 6°
The California factor nexus standard follows the MTC model
formulation's threshold amounts. 6' Like the MTC model, those amounts are
150. Multistate Tax Commission, Factor Presence Nexus Standard for
Business Activity Taxes (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/
MultistateTaxCommission/Uniformity/UniformityProjects/A- Z/FactorPresence
NexusStandardBusinessActTaxes.pdf [hereinafter MTC, Factor]. The MTC's factor
nexus standard is based on a proposal by economist Charles McLure, Jr. See
McLure, Implementing, supra note 10, at 1295-97.
151. MTC, Factor, supra note 150, § B(1).
152. Id. § B(2) (providing that the state tax administrator shall adjust those
threshold amounts if the consumer price index has changed by 5 percent or more
since the last adjustment").
153. Id. § C.
154. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23101(b) (West 2012).
155. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-2:39-22-301.1 (2012).
156. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.621 (West 2012).
157. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 575 1.01(1) (West 2012).
158. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1218(H)(3)-(6) (2012).
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.067(6) (2012).
160. A number of other states have adopted quantitative nexus standards
specifically for financial institutions. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra
note 16, at 6.29. Those statutes raise the same constitutional questions as do the
broader factor nexus standards discussed herein. However, due to the limited scope
of those statutes on one particular industry, they are not specifically discussed
herein. Note, however, that attention will need to be paid to this issue if and when
Congress evaluates a national nexus standard.
161. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23101 (b).
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also to be adjusted for inflation. 62 A taxpayer's sales, property, and payroll,
however, are determined under California's general rules for apportionment
rather than under specific formulas for purposes of factor nexus. 63 California
also deviates from the MTC model in a significant way. The California
Franchise Tax Board has recently indicated that the state's quantitative nexus
standard is not necessarily a bright-line rule for nexus in the state. Rather, the
Board has indicated that it can find that a taxpayer has nexus with the state if
that taxpayer meets the state's factor nexus thresholds or if it "actively
engages in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or
profit in California."' 64 The ability to "opt out" of the factor nexus standard
makes that standard nearly meaningless in determining the lower boundary
of the state's reach under economic nexus.
The Michigan corporate income tax also utilizes a factor nexus
standard based on the MTC model. Under this tax, a taxpayer has a
substantial nexus with the state if it has a physical presence in the state for
more than one day or if it actively solicits in the state and has Michigan gross
receipts of at least $350,000.16' The Michigan statute does not include
inflation adjustments or a unique provision for determining a taxpayer's
Michigan gross receipts. Presumably, then, the state's general apportionment
rule will apply to the factor nexus determination.1
61
Ohio adopted the MTC's factor nexus standard for purposes of its
commercial activity tax in 2005.167 The statute differs from the MTC model
by providing neither an inflation-adjustment provision nor specialized
apportionment rules for purposes of the factor nexus standard. Ohio law also
provides an alternative rule under which a person has a substantial nexus
with the state if the person "[o]therwise has nexus with the state to an extent
that the person can be required to remit the tax []under... the Constitution
162. Id. §§ 23101(c); 17041(h).
163. Id. §§ 23101(b)(2)-(4); 25120(c), (e)-(f); 25129-25131; 25133.
164. State of California Franchise Tax Board, General Information on New
Rules for Doing Business in California, www.tb.ca.gov/businesses/New_
Rules for DoingBusiness inCalifomia.shtml (last visited June 14, 2012)
[hereinafter California, General Information].
165. MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 206.621 (West 2012). This standard was
previously incorporated into the Michigan business tax. That tax was repealed in
favor of the corporate income tax on May 25, 2011. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 38. For a
discussion of this bill and its effect, see Cara Griffith, A Primer on the New
Michigan Corporate Income Tax, 60 ST. TAX NOTES 819 (June 13, 2011).
166. The Michigan provision is less closely related to the MTC model than
other states' formulations because it includes only a sales factor and a de minimis
physical presence factor. However, for purposes of this article, it is discussed with
those other standards because it relies on a quantitative formulation.
167. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 575 1.01(I) (West 2012).
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of the United States."'168 Oklahoma followed that model (including reserving
the state's right to impose its tax if the taxpayer otherwise has nexus
sufficient under the U.S. Constitution) 169 with its enactment of a business
activity tax in 2010.170 The effect of the Ohio and Oklahoma opt-out
provisions is the same as the effect of the opt-out policy adopted by the
California Franchise Tax Board.
Finally, Washington has adopted a bifurcated approach for purposes
of its business and occupations tax. 17 1 The state applies a factor nexus
concept to out-of-state entities with respect to their service and royalty
income. However, taxpayers with income from retailing, wholesaling, or
other classifications are still subject to a physical presence standard. 72 For
taxpayers engaged in activities subject to the factor nexus standard,
Washington has adopted the MTC levels for the property and payroll factors,
but it reduced the sales threshold to $250,000 - one-half of the MTC
model's amount.' 73 Those factors are adjusted for inflation consistent with
the MTC's model statute, 174 but they are determined under the state's general
apportionment rules. 1
75
In addition to these state legislative factor nexus standards, two
states have adopted factor nexus by administrative action. First, the Colorado
Department of Revenue adopted a factor nexus standard by regulation in
April of 2010.176 The Colorado regulation follows the MTC model
formulation's threshold amounts and adopts the MTC's factor calculation
provisions, but it does not provide for inflation adjustments.1 77 Connecticut
revenue authorities similarly adopted factor nexus at the agency level,
supplementing the state's statutory qualitative economic nexus standard via
publication. Under that agency guidance, a corporation has an economic
168. Id. § 5751.01(H)(4).
169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1218(H)(7) (2012).
170. Id. § 1218(H)(3)-(6).
171. The Washington business and occupations tax is a tax on the "value of
products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of [a] business." WASH. REV.
CODE § 82.04.220(1) (2012).
172. Id. § 82.04.067(6).
173. Id. § 82.04.067(1).
174. Id. § 82.04.067(5).
175. Id. § 82.04.067(4).
176. 33 COLO. REG. 8 (April 2010), http://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/
RegisterHome.do?pyear=20 10.
177. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-2:39-22-301.1(2)(c) (2012). Taxpayers
subject to the Department's special apportionment methods calculate their nexus
factors consistent with those regulations as they were defined for tax periods prior to
January 1, 2009. Id. § 201-2:39-22-301.1(2)(c)(iv).
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nexus with Connecticut if its activities have resulted in at least $500,000 of
Connecticut sales during the tax year.1
These divergent legislative and regulatory actions show that states
are keen to adopt quantitative economic nexus standards based upon the
MTC model, but states are not limiting their reach to that set forth by the
MTC. States have adopted widely divergent sales thresholds, many fail to
provide for inflation adjustments, and some retain the right to tax businesses
that do not meet their factor thresholds.
Il. EVALUATING STATE ECONOMIC NEXUS FORMULATIONS
The discussion above shows that significant variation exists among
states' economic nexus standards, whether in qualitative or quantitative form.
The most obvious variation is among states that have insisted on
"heightened" economic nexus formulations and those that have either failed
to address the scope of their formulations or those that simply rely on source
principles. 1
79
Evaluating the validity of source based economic nexus is
straightforward' - its validity depends on whether the Commerce Clause
requires something more than the simple derivation of revenue from a
state. 18 Heightened economic nexus formulations present a much different
inquiry. Such formulations purport to require heightened levels of connection
to a state and, in doing so, attempt to avoid the more difficult constitutional
question presented by economic nexus once it is accepted that physical
presence is not required. Those heightened formulations thus serve to lessen
the need for the Court to evaluate that issue and purport to provide a
meaningful method for evaluating economic nexus disputes moving forward.
But are those formulations likely to remain as restrictive as they are today?
Do they rest on foundations that will stand firm in the face of continued
evaluation and pressure for more state revenue? If the answers to these
questions are "no," then states' current heightened economic nexus
formulations provide only a snapshot of what economic nexus currently
178. Connecticut, Q&A, supra note 145.
179. The term "heightened" in this sense refers to those economic nexus
standards that require some level of economic connection to a state that is
significantly higher than the minimum connections required by the Due Process
Clause or the simple derivation of revenue from a state.
180. To call the evaluation "straightforward" is not to call it "easy." It is
straightforward because it directly presents the fundamental constitutional question,
not because that question is easily answered.
181. The initial step in determining the validity of those standards is thus
determining whether Quill compels the conclusion that the Commerce Clause
provides a higher jurisdictional bar on business activity taxes than does the Due
Process Clause. See infra Part III.A.1.
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means rather than formulations on which taxpayers can rely. Significantly,
they would also lack meaning in the search for a rational economic nexus
standard going forward. This section thus analyzes whether and how those
formulations will develop over time.
A. The Future of Qualitative Economic Nexus
The discussion above evidences that states' qualitative economic
nexus formulations have taken many forms, from the MBNA W Va.
substantial economic presence test to unarticulated standards providing no
explicit bounds. It also shows that the courts that have evaluated the scope of
their states' economic nexus formulations have indicated that those
formulations provide heightened jurisdictional bars that are more onerous
than that provided by the Due Process Clause. Those heightened standards
require taxpayers to have "significant" or "substantial" economic
connections with a state.18 2 Constitutionally adequate economic nexus under
those standards can thus only be found where a taxpayer has undertaken
frequent, meaningful, and systematic efforts to exploit the market of the
taxing state. 183
Evaluation of those standards shows three fundamental weaknesses
that call into question the sustainability of their heightened formulations.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not
compel elevation of those Commerce Clause standards over the Due Process
Clause. Second, established precedent shows that the concept of
substantiality has very little meaning for purposes of state tax nexus
analyses. Third, those standards unnaturally elevate physical contacts over
economic contacts.
1. The Gratuitous Elevation of the Commerce Clause over the
Due Process Clause
As discussed above, state courts adopting heightened economic
nexus standards have done so based on a belief that the Commerce Clause
must restrict state power more than the Due Process Clause restricts state
power.114 Each of those courts has expressed support for this belief by
182. Tax Commissioner of W. Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d
226, 235 (W. Va. 2006).
183. Id. at 234-35.
184. Id. at 235 ("exploitation of the market [under the Commerce Clause]
must be greater in degree than under the Due Process standard"); Capital One Bank
v. Commissioner of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 76, 86 (Mass. 2009) (stating that the concept
of substantial nexus "plainly means a greater presence, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, than the minimum connection between a State and a taxpayer that
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referencing Quill and its discussion regarding the purposes and requirements
of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. 185 The steadfastness of those
heightened economic nexus standards thus depends on whether Quill actually
commands that result. It does not.
Prior to Quill, the Court had held that both the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses required that a remote vendor have a physical presence in a
state before the state could require the business to collect its sales or use
taxes. 186 The Quill Court, however, recognized that its general Due Process
jurisprudence had evolved to reject the physical presence rule in favor of a
minimum-contacts standard.' 87 The Court thus agreed to "lower" its Due
Process bar for purposes of analyzing state taxes. At the same time, the Court
determined to maintain its physical presence rule under the Commerce
Clause (at least for purposes of state sales and use taxes).188 That
simultaneous lowering of the Due Process bar and maintenance of a
heightened Commerce Clause bar can be interpreted to mean that the
Commerce Clause requires a "higher" jurisdictional bar than does the Due
Process Clause, and states have certainly felt limited by that construction.
Such a conclusion holds true, however, only as long as the Commerce Clause
still imposes a physical presence requirement. Indeed, the comparison to be
made in Quill is not between the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, but
between the physical presence standard and the minimum contacts standard.
If the Commerce Clause test is no longer one of physical presence (as is the
case if one accepts an economic nexus standard), then that comparison is no
longer relevant.' 89
would satisfy a due process inquiry"); Kmart Props., Inc. v. N.M. Tax'n & Rev.
Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 36 (N.M. 2001) ("Although Quill did establish that 'substantial
nexus' under Complete Auto Transit has more than the minimum contacts required
of due process.., we need not quantify that difference here.").
185. MBNA W. Va., 640 S.E.2d at 235 (responding to the taxpayer's
argument that an economic nexus test was "in fact [I applying a Due Process
minimum contacts standard in violation of Quill"); Capital One, 899 N.E.2d at 86
(citing back to the court's discussion of Quill's Commerce Clause discussion in a
prior footnote); Kmart Props., 131 P.3d at 36 (noting that Quill established that the
Commerce Clause imposes a higher burden than the Due Process Clause).
186. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Rev. of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967).
187. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
188. Id. at 311.
189. For the mathematically inclined, assume that "PP" stands for the
physical presence standard, that "MC" stands for the minimum-contacts standard,
that "DP" stands for the Due Process Clause standard, and that "CC" stands for the
Commerce Clause standard. Under Quill, it can be said that CC=PP and that
DP=MC. It can also be said that PP>MC. It necessarily follows that CC>DP (i.e.,
that the Commerce Clause imposes a higher burden than the Due Process Clause).
However, if a state accepts the validity of economic nexus, it necessarily believes
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Quite simply, Quill's concomitant lowering of its Due Process
standard and its adherence to a physical presence rule under the Commerce
Clause does not mandate that the Commerce Clause always be more
restrictive than the Due Process Clause. It only does so as long as the
Commerce Clause requires a physical presence standard. For states rejecting
a physical presence rule, then, Quill provides a different lesson. Its only
guidance is found in its discussion of the purposes for the jurisdictional
requirements under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
The Quill Court very clearly explained that the constitutional
protections provided under those clauses are based on different concerns and
policies.' 90 The Court also explained that "a corporation may have the
'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process
Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with the State as required by the
Commerce Clause."' 9' This statement reflects that the Commerce Clause can
impose a higher jurisdictional bar on states' powers. However, it does not
necessarily require that it do so. It also does not establish any required
quantum of difference between the two or foreclose the possibility that a
taxpayer could have a substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause without
having the minimum contacts necessary for Due Process nexus. 192 The only
true lesson that one can take from Quill is that the requirements under those
constitutional provisions are truly "different."' 93 A Commerce Clause inquiry
must focus on the structural impacts of the state tax at issue, and a Due
Process inquiry must focus on fairness to the individual taxpayer. This does
not necessarily compel a heightened economic nexus standard, and courts'
reliance on Quill to justify such standards is thus unwarranted. States'
heightened economic nexus formulations thus have great latent structural
that CC E PP. As a consequence, it does not follow that CC must necessarily be
greater than DP.
190. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 ("Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two
standards are animated by different constitutional concerns and policies.").
191. Id. at 313.
192. Assume, for example, a customer from State A travels to State B and
makes a significant purchase from B Corp. B Corp operates only in State B, limits its
advertising to mailed advertisements within State B, and sends no personnel outside
of the state. If State A sources B Corp's income from the customer to State A
(because State A was the ultimate destination of the goods), B Corp could be subject
to State A's income tax under an economic nexus standard. However, it is very
likely that B Corp would lack the minimum contacts necessary to be subject to State
A's tax under the Due Process Clause.




weakness. If those standards are challenged as unduly restrictive, it is
unlikely that Quill will compel their preservation. 194
2. The Insignificance of Substantiality
Just as the prior analysis shows a jurisprudential weakness in the
foundation of states' heightened economic nexus standards, current case law
under the physical presence test shows a weakness in the principles used to
frame those standards. Those standards have relied on formulations that
require "substantial" or "significant" economic presences. Courts adopting
those standards thus presume that those adjectives provide meaningful
limitations on state power. Current nexus jurisprudence proves that to be
untrue.
As previously discussed, the very basic standard under which
Commerce Clause nexus disputes are evaluated is the Complete Auto
standard, which requires that a taxpayer have a "substantial" nexus in a
state.' 95 Consequently, courts evaluating nexus disputes in sales tax cases
have extensively evaluated the concept of substantiality. Those courts have
been forced to determine how much of a physical presence is required to
meet Complete Auto's substantial nexus test.196 The courts' decisions in
those cases establish that the "substantial" qualifier is substantial only in
name.
The most direct guidance from the Court on this question came in its
decision in National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization.197 As discussed above, 198 this case involved the question of
194. Of course, Quill continues to compel a physical presence rule for sales
and use taxes until the Court or Congress provides otherwise.
195. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
196. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 19.02[4]. This
continued debate has led some to question whether the Quill Court's bright-line test
achieved its goal of reducing litigation. Laskin, Trademark Royalties, supra note
112, at 11 n.46. That critique, however, focuses on the area of continued debate
rather than recognizing the certainty that Quill did provide. Quill did provide
certainty and eliminate litigation for taxpayers with only an economic nexus in a
state (for purposes of sales and use taxes). To ignore that benefit is akin to ignoring
the number of fatalities that seat belts have prevented by focusing on the remaining
number of traffic deaths. As the Michigan Court of Appeals aptly stated, "the
'bright-line' rule of Quill does not cut as cleanly on both sides. It definitively
answers the question who cannot be taxed . . . but leaves somewhat open the
question who may be taxed." Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Rev. Div., Dep't of
Treasury, 562 N.W.2d 219, 222 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
197. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551




whether the National Geographic Society could be required to collect
California sales and use tax where its only physical presence in California
was its maintenance of two offices in the state. 199 The California Supreme
Court upheld the imposition of that obligation on National Geographic,
adopting a "slightest presence" test.
200
The Supreme Court rejected California's slightest presence test, but
did not opine as to the proper level of contacts required. Rather, the Court
simply noted that National Geographic's actions in the state2 0 1 established
"much more substantial presence than the expression 'slightest presence'
connotes '20 2 and held that "the Society's continuous presence in California in
offices that solicit advertising for its magazine provides a sufficient nexus to
justify" the state's imposition of tax.20 3 The National Geographic Court thus
provided only minimal guidance on the magnitude of physical presence
required under Complete Auto.
In the absence of further guidance from the Court, a number of states
have interpreted its rejection of the slightest presence test to mean that a
taxpayer's physical presence in a state must be only somewhat greater than a
slightest presence.20 4 The seminal case in this regard is In re Orvis Company
Inc. v. New York.205 The Orvis court first determined that the substantial
198. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
199. Nat 7 Geographic, 430 U.S. at 552-54.
200. Id. at 555-56. The California court noted that "the slightest presence
within such taxing state . .. will permit the state constitutionally to impose on the
seller the duty of collecting the use tax from such mail order purchasers and the
liability for failure to do so." Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equalization,
547 P.2d 458, 462 (Cal. 1976).
201. National Geographic's physical presence in California consisted of the
"maintenance of two offices in the State and solicitation by employees assigned to
those offices of advertising copy in the range of $1 million annually." Nat'l
Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556.
202. Id. Interestingly, the Court supported its conclusion in part by pointing
to its earlier decision in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Wash. Department of
Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), in which it upheld the imposition of a direct tax on a
taxpayer that had only a single employee in the taxing state. Nat'l Geographic, 430
U.S. at 557. The Court found it "significant" that it had labeled the taxpayer's nexus
argument in that case "frivolous." Id.
203. Nat'l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 562.
204. Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y. (In re Orvis Co.), 654
N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995); Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Rev. Div., Dep't of Treasury,
562 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.067(6)
(2012).
205. 654 N.E.2d 954. Orvis involved two cases that were consolidated on
appeal from the New York Appellate Division. In the first - In re Orvis Co. - the
taxpayer's physical presence in the state was limited to visits to as many as nineteen
customers on average of four times a year. Id. at 962. In the other - In re Vt.
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nexus requirement of Complete Auto did not require a taxpayer to have a
20
substantial physical presence in the taxing state. 06 Instead, the court stated
that the taxpayer's presence need only "be demonstrably more than a
'slightest presence.' 20 7 The court then determined that the taxpayers' visits
to nineteen customers four times per year and forty-one in-state visits over a
three-year period, respectively, satisfied that standard.2°SThe Orvis court's
distillation of National Geographic down to a standard that requires only
more than a slightest presence has been adopted by a number of other
states.209 The quantum of physical presence required to establish a substantial
nexus under current law is thus fairly minimal - and certainly falls short of
anything systematic or continual.
This discussion is not intended to intimate that states find a
substantial nexus in each case where a taxpayer has any repeated or sustained
physical presence in a state. 2'0 However, it does show that states do not feel
Informational Processing, Inc. - the taxpayer had visited customers' locations in
the state forty-one times during the three-year audit period. Id.
206. Id. at 959 ("Quill simply cannot be read as equating a substantial
physical presence of the vendor in the taxing State with the substantial nexus prong
of the Complete Auto test ... ").
207. Id. at 960-61.
208. Id. at 961-62. Cf In re Petition of NADA Servs. Corp., No. 810592,
1996 WL 54197, *15 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 1996) (holding that the slightest
presence test was not met where the taxpayer's connection with the state consisted of
twenty trips into New York and an unspecified number of trips in the state by
independent contractors over the three-year audit period).
209. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 82.04.067(6) (2012) ("a person is
deemed to have a substantial nexus with this state if the person has a physical
presence in this state, which need only be demonstrably more than a slightest
presence"); Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 803 (I11. 1996)
(holding that the taxpayer had "established more than a slight physical presence
within the [s]tate"); Magnetek Controls, 562 N.W.2d at 224 ("tax obligations may be
imposed, consistent with the Commerce Clause, on taxpayers with 'demonstrably
more than a 'slightest presence" in a state'); Comptroller of Maryland, Nexus
Information for Sales and Use Tax, http://business.marylandtaxes.com/taxinfo/sales
anduse/nexus.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) ("All that is required is for the out-of-
state vendor to demonstrate more than a 'slightest presence' in the taxing state.");
State of Tennessee Office of the Attorney General, Opinion 09-101, (May 28, 2009),
http://www.tn.gov/attomeygeneral/op/2009/op/oplOl.pdf ("By contrast, the
Commerce Clause's 'substantial nexus' prong requires something more than the
'slightest presence' in the taxing jurisdiction.").
210. For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the imposition
of the state's use tax against an out-of-state vendor was not permissible based upon
the vendor's eleven visits into the state over a forty-eight-month audit period. In re
Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1113, 1122-23 (Kan. 2000). The Florida
Supreme Court came to the same conclusion where the taxpayer was present in the
state only three days a year. Dep't of Rev. of Fla. v. Share Int'l, Inc., 676 So. 2d
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bound to require an extensive exploitation of a state simply because the
relevant standard incorporates the adjective "substantial." Rather, once a
physical presence of more than a slightest amount is established, a taxpayer
is generally found to be subject to the state's taxing authority. The concept of
substantiality simply has very little meaning under current nexus
jurisprudence.21'
The totality of this authority calls into question the intractability of
the substantial economic presence test. Just as relatively minimal levels of
physical presence in a state appear to satisfy the substantial nexus
requirement, it seems likely that increasingly lower levels of economic
212presence could satisfy the substantial economic presence test. This
conclusion is certainly supported by looking at the very authority that states
and commentators cite as support for an economic nexus standard. Recall
that in International Harvester, the taxpayers simply invested in a
corporation that engaged in business in the taxing state. The court's decision
to uphold the tax in that case rested solely on the fact that the taxpayers
derived income from Wisconsin, not on any showing of a heightened
1362 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1056 (1997); cf Lamtec Corp. v. Dep't of
Rev., 246 P.3d 788, 790, 795 (Wash. 2011) (upholding the imposition of tax based
on fifty to seventy in-state visits over the course of seven years); Ariz. Dep't of Rev.
v. Care Computer Sys., Inc., 4 P.3d 469, 471-72, 474-75 (Ariz. 2000) (upholding
the state's imposition of tax on an out-of-state vendor whose sales personnel visited
the state seven times and whose training personnel visited the state for eighty days
during the seven year audit period); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.621 (West
2012) (imposing the state's income tax on corporations that are physically present in
the state for more than one day). For a detailed discussion of these cases and others,
see HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 19.0214].
211. To be fair, the MBNA W. Va. economic nexus formulation does
purport to require frequent or systematic economic contacts with a state. One could
thus claim that substantial economic nexus is not subject to the same erosion as the
physical presence standard. The answer to this claim is two-fold. First, not all
heightened qualitative economic nexus standards contain these further qualifiers.
Second, the terms "frequent" and "systematic" are not unlike the term "substantial"
in that they do not have independent meaning. They must be measured against
something. In that way, they are subject to the same pressures as the "substantial"
qualifier of Complete Auto's substantial nexus test.
212. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. Of course, this
discussion assumes that one can quantify and attribute economic contacts in the
same way that one can quantify and attribute a taxpayer's physical contacts. This
type of inquiry may not be appropriate when discussing nexus in the context of
electronic commerce. See Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation ofElectronic
Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 691, 694-95,
701-702 (1998) (arguing that attempting to assign economic contacts to a particular




economic nexus. Thus, if that case is relevant to an enforcement jurisdiction
analysis, it significantly undercuts the significance of substantiality as a
requirement for economic nexus.213
3. The Arbitrary Elevation of Physical Presence over
Economic Presence
Heightened economic nexus standards purport to require taxpayers
to have much more meaningful economic contacts with a state than the
physical contacts that are required to establish a substantial nexus under
Orvis. Those standards therefore necessarily ascribe more constitutional
significance to physical contacts than to economic contacts,214 and their
legitimacy - from a theoretical perspective - rests on whether that
elevation of physical contacts is warranted.
Answering that question is a short task. Elevating physical contacts
in that way would cut at the core of the rationale for an economic nexus
standard as a matter of first import. The economic nexus standard is based in
large part on states' recognitions of the great technological and social
changes that have made economic exploitation the equal sister of physical
exploitation in the modem economy. The emergence of the Internet, for
example, has largely obviated the need for businesses in many industries to
have physical storefronts. In addition, other businesses have developed solely
in the digital realm - cloud computing or online-dating services for
instance. It is now possible for a business to exploit a remote market more
comprehensively with electronic methods than it can with a local physical
presence. For example, would anyone argue that a shoe manufacturer in
North Carolina could exploit the California market more fully as a transient
vendor on a street corner in Berkeley than by setting up an Internet storefront
and sending repeated e-mail solicitations to California customers? Certainly
not. A heightened standard for economic exploitation simply does not
comport with this economic reality.
213. The preceding analysis of the insignificance of substantiality has been
intended to show that states' limitations of economic nexus can effectively change
without requiring changes to their current formulations - that is, that current
formulations do not necessarily require a heightened economic nexus standard. It is a
separate issue, however, to consider whether those standards will change. Will states
push those standards ever lower? Will they seek to expand their power in that way?
This issue is discussed below.
214. Michigan Compiled Laws § 206.621(1) clearly demonstrates this in
the context of a heightened quantitative standard. That statute imposes tax on
businesses that have gross receipts of $350,000 or more sourced to Michigan or that
have a physical presence in the state for a period of only more than one day. The
significance of one day of physical presence over hundreds of thousands of dollars of
gross receipts is remarkable.
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A different standard for economic and physical presence would
simply ignore the vast diversity of economic "experiences" that can occur in
the modem economy. A physical presence can range from an unintended
frolic across state lines in a company vehicle to the operation of multiple
physical storefronts. Similarly, an economic presence can range from an
undirected electronic communication to a significant portfolio of long-term
licensing agreements with multiple businesses in a state. The constitutional
protection afforded to taxpayers under the Commerce Clause cannot rest on a
distinction as meaningless as whether they physically or economically
exploit their markets. Rather, the quantity and quality of contacts must
govern.
Of course, this equivalization of physical and economic presences
conflicts with the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, which does
elevate physical presences over other presences to a certain extent.z 5 Under
that jurisprudence, a taxpayer that does not have a physical presence in a
state needs to otherwise have "minimum contacts" with that state to be
subject to its jurisdiction. The Court thus holds out physical presences as
different, more meaningful, than other presences in that context. Why then
can we limit the import of physical presences for purposes of a Commerce
Clause analysis? Why can we be comfortable equating physical and
economic contacts in that realm? The answer is twofold.
First, different purposes underlie the Court's Due Process and
Commerce Clause standards.21 6 Due Process is concerned with fairness and
notice whereas the Commerce Clause is concerned about economic factors
- here, the impact of a state's nexus standard on interstate commerce."'
Thus, although physical presences are given some weight for purposes of
personal jurisdiction, that factor alone is not sufficient to conclude that they
should have the same relevancy under the Commerce Clause. The
importance of physical presences for that purpose depends on the extent to
which they impact the burdens of state taxation. Only if they lessen those
burdens (as they lessen our concerns about fairness and notice for personal
jurisdiction inquiries) should they have weight in the relevant Commerce
Clause standard.
A quick analysis shows that physical presences do not lessen tax-
compliance burdens such that they should be given weight for Commerce
Clause purposes. Fundamentally, if an out-of-state business's costs of
215. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice"').
216. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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compliance with a state's income tax laws are $x, how would those costs be
less than $x if the business decided to have an employee attend a conference
in the state or to retain title to inventory in the state? The business's burdens
of compliance would be unrelated to those minimal physical connections.
Rather, the burdens of the state's tax system would be related to the rate of
the state's tax, the clarity and complexity of its reporting rules, the corporate
structure of the taxpayer, and the taxpayer's economic returns from the state.
The taxpayer's physical presence in the state would play no role in those
costs. 8 For these reasons, physical presences should have a lesser role (if
any) for purposes of the Commerce Clause than they do for purposes of
analyzing personal jurisdiction.
Of course, to say that physical presences should play a lesser role for
Commerce Clause purposes than for purposes of analyzing personal
jurisdiction leaves them with little worth. The Court's personal jurisdiction
standard already reflects little reverence for physical presences. The standard
against which physical presences are measured is only one of "minimum"
contacts. Thus, physical presences are only afforded more weight than
economic contacts that are something less than minimum. That is not saying
much. If we start with that limited elevation of physical presences and
discount it further by the relative lack of importance of physical presences
for Commerce Clause purposes, it is easy to justify putting physical
presences and economic presences on the same plane, as suggested above.
219
Once that occurs, Orvis and its kin have considerable meaning when
evaluating states' promises of heightened economic nexus. Just as a
taxpayer's limited, but repeated physical presence in a state creates
substantial nexus under the physical presence standard, so too will limited,
but repeated economic exploitations likely create a substantial nexus under
an economic nexus standard. There is simply no theoretical (or, as discussed
above, jurisprudential) basis under which economic exploitation should be
held to a meaningfully higher standard than physical exploitation."'
218. It could be argued that a physical presence would actually increase
those costs rather than decrease them. That would occur because the business's
physical presence could generate an in-state property or payroll factor, which could
increase the taxpayer's return-preparation difficulty and level of tax owed. Of
course, these impacts suggest that out-of-state businesses may be more burdened if it
has a minimal physical presence than if it has none.
219. One could go even further and argue that perhaps physical presence
alone is insufficient under the Commerce Clause, but that goes beyond the bounds of
this article.
220. Of course, it is much more difficult to accidentally find oneself
physically present in a jurisdiction than economically present. However, a critique
based on that rationale would speak more towards fairness concerns than it does to
the difference between the quality of economic and physical contacts. That fairness




The analysis above shows that states' heightened qualitative
economic nexus formulations are not compelled by the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, that the actual language of those formulations provides
only limited practical limitations on states' applications of those
formulations, and that there is no theoretical basis for those formulations'
elevation of physical presence over economic presence. What, then, will
actually happen to those standards? Will they necessarily weaken over time?
Of course, none of us can know the future. Nonetheless, a few
factors indicate that states' expansion of their power is most likely. First,
states have an obvious interest in expanding their taxing power to the
greatest extent possible. Broad economic nexus standards would give states
the flexibility to deal with new situations (or, perhaps more directly to the
point, abusive tax structures) as they arise even if, as a matter of policy,
states do not fully exercise their self-defined power. Second, and more
fundamentally, states have little real reason to deny themselves that power.
As shown above, there is little jurisprudential or theoretical basis for a
restrictive economic nexus standard. The only reason for state restraint
would be to avoid unintentionally inviting the Supreme Court to the party.
However, given the Supreme Court's general lack of interest in reviewing
nexus disputes (and given states' confidence in their power under the
Dormant Commerce Clause), assuming restraint on this basis is suspect. To
the contrary, states may wish to push the boundaries precisely to get the
Supreme Court to look at the issue - and to support economic nexus
directly.
The one potential obstacle to an expanded economic nexus standard,
then, would appear to be state courts. Will state courts reject attempts by
state legislatures and revenue authorities to expand economic nexus? Even if
they felt so inclined, the analysis offered above suggests that state courts will
have limited bases on which to require heightened economic nexus
standards. Unless a physical presence rule is required, there is little
jurisprudential basis for limiting economic nexus in that way. It is thus
difficult to imagine that states' qualitative economic nexus formulations will
not deteriorate over time.
B. The Future of Quantitative Factor Nexus
In lieu of the qualitative standards discussed above, a number of
state legislatures and revenue departments have adopted quantitative factor
nexus rules consistent with the MTC model formulation. 22' Those rules
221. See supra Part II.C.2.
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provide much needed certainty for taxpayers doing nexus analyses,222 and
they provide significant administrative benefits. 223 Unfortunately, however,
state factor nexus formulations are inherently arbitrary and hence
exceptionally malleable. Three forms of flexibility224 prevent those standards
from being suitable forms for economic nexus going forward: (1) magnitude
flexibility; (2) definitional flexibility; and (3) application flexibility.
1. Magnitude Flexibility
Factor nexus operates by exempting from tax those businesses that
do not exceed prescribed minimal levels of property, payroll, or sales in a
state. The determination of the magnitude of those levels is thus of the
utmost importance to both businesses and state revenue authorities.
Unfortunately, however, the levels at which those thresholds are set is
ultimately arbitrary. Nexus under the Commerce Clause has never been
recognized as a purely quantitative inquiry. Thus, a state need only set its
threshold amounts high enough to effectively eliminate any unreasonable
risk that taxpayers will exceed them without having expended
constitutionally significant efforts to exploit its market.225 There is nothing
that requires states to act uniformly. Indeed, significant variation already
exists among the states that have adopted factor nexus standards.
As noted above, the MTC model sets the sales factor threshold at
$500,000.226 Many states have also adopted that threshold, but not all states
have been uniform. Michigan has adopted a sales threshold that is $350,000
222. But see supra notes 165 and 170 and accompanying text (discussing
two states' provisions allowing them to opt out of their factor nexus provisions).
223. The standard also loosens the physical presence standard by allowing
certain levels of property and payroll in the state without requiring the taxpayer to
pay tax in that state.
224. Although flexibility is sometimes viewed as a valuable trait, it is not
favorable in this context. Flexibility undermines the value of a factor nexus standard
as providing certain, uniform, bright-line guidance.
225. In proposing a factor nexus standard, Professor McLure was very
deliberate in noting that his standard would require "significant amounts" of activity
in the taxing state. McLure, Implementing, supra note 10, at 1295-96 ("The
repetition of the words 'significant amounts' in the previous paragraph is intended to
prevent a finding of nexus where the economic activities of the corporation that
could create nexus are de minimis."). There is not universal agreement that all states'
factor nexus thresholds are currently set high enough. See Steven Roll, Slates Take
Contrasting Approaches to Implementing Economic Nexus Standards, State Tax
Blog http://www.bna.com/blogs_post.aspx?id=2147484887&blogid=97 (last visited
May 18, 2012) (noting that Fred Nicely, tax counsel for the Committee on State
Taxation had expressed that Washington's $250,000 threshold was impermissibly
low).
226. See MTC, Factor, supra note 150.
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- only 70 percent of the MTC model.227 The sales threshold in Washington
is even lower, at one-half of the MTC model - $250,000.228 This disparate
practice is the result of using dollar values as a proxy for a real constitutional
standard. Until a constitutional boundary is established, states will likely
continue to adopt lower standards. 229 Further, states that have already
adopted threshold amounts will be free to lower them. Magnitude flexibility
will almost certainly lead to magnitude erosion over time.
Another less apparent way for factor thresholds to differ or erode
over time is through the use or nonuse of inflation adjustments. The MTC
model requires annual review and potential inflation adjustment of the
factors,230 and California and Washington have adopted that rule. Other
states have not been uniform. As shown above, Colorado, Connecticut,
Michigan, Ohio, and Oklahoma do not require inflation adjustments. 3 A
necessary consequence of this lack of uniformity is that states' thresholds can
vary from one another over time even if they were enacted at the same level.
2. Definitional Flexibility
Definitional flexibility refers to the fact that the determination of a
taxpayer's factors is purely a matter of legislative (or perhaps administrative)
discretion.232 This manifests itself more clearly with respect to a taxpayer's
sales factor than its property or payroll factors because attributing property or
payroll to a state is generally self-evident. The sourcing of sales is much
227. MICH. COmP. LAWS. ANN. § 206.621 (West 2012).
228. WASH. REv. CODE § 82.04.067 (2012).
229. This again assumes that states will utilize the current uncertainty
regarding the bounds of economic nexus to lower their standards over time. It
appears most reasonable to assume that states will seek to expand their taxing power
as far as possible. Of course, this begs the question of why states have not already
done so. The answer is two-fold. First, states have wisely chosen to litigate economic
nexus disputes that involve taxpayers with very significant income from their states
(and hence large potential tax liabilities). This has allowed state courts to adopt
standards to meet those limited facts. Second, economic nexus is still in its relative
infancy. States have been focused on obtaining widespread acceptance of that
standard in the abstract. States thus have been justifiably cautious with their
economic nexus standards to date. As the concept is more readily accepted, it seems
safe to assume that the aforementioned expansion will begin.
230. MTC, Factor, supra note 150, § B(2).
231. See supra notes 166-179 and accompanying text.
232. See Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional
Intervention in State Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 ST.
TAX NOTES 721, 733 (Mar. 1, 2004) [hereinafter McLure & Hellerstein,
Congressional Intervention] (noting that the "choice of apportionment formulas...
and the definition of each of the factors are, to some extent, arbitrary").
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more problematic. The revenue from a single sale of a service, for example,
can be attributed to several states.
Assume that a lawyer in New York receives a call from an Illinois
client that has a legal question related to a patent used in its manufacturing
process in its Georgia facility. The lawyer undertakes her legal research in
her New York office and calls the client in Illinois with her advice. The
client immediately calls the facility manager in Georgia to implement the
advice and eagerly awaits the lawyer's bill. The income that the lawyer
receives from the client could be fairly sourced to at least three states: the
state where the work was performed (New York), the state where the client
received the advice and the bill for the lawyer's services (Illinois), or the
state where the advice was ultimately used (Georgia). The sourcing of those
receipts will depend on how the state legislatures or revenue authorities
determine to define their sales factors. 233 As a result, unless states adopt the
same methods for calculating taxpayers' factors, wide variations can exist
regarding how those factors are calculated from state to state. This concern is
not merely academic. As shown above in Part II.C.2, the MTC has issued
model attribution rules, but states adopting a factor nexus standard have not
uniformly adopted them.
Sales factors can also be manipulated due to concerns other than
properly sourcing income. For example, significant attention has been paid to
the potential for "nowhere" income that results from the apportionment of
sales to states in which a business is not subject to tax -either due to
jurisdictional reasons or because the state does not impose a corporate
income tax.234 States have responded to this concern by adopting throwout
and throwback rules to further the goal that all of a taxpayer's income be
subject to tax somewhere. Apportionment formulae thus represent not only a
method for properly attributing income to its source state, but also a method
233. For recent discussions of the sourcing of services income, see Cara
Griffith, Using Market-Based Sourcing for Service Receipts: The Difficulties, 56 ST.
TAX NoTEs 387 (May 3, 2010); Giles Sutton, Jaime Yesnowitz, Chuck Jones &
Terry F. Conley, The Nuances of Market-Based Sourcing of Service Revenue: Not
All Markets Look the Same, 21 J. Multistate Tax'n & Incentives 2, 6 (May 2011);
John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein, The Market State Approach to the Attribution
of Receipts From Services, 59 ST. TAX NoTES 331 (Jan. 31, 2011). Of course, the
same issue can arise with respect to the sale of goods. Sales of goods can be
attributed to the state where the items are sold, shipped, or put to use.
234. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 9.18[1][b]; Institute
on Taxation and Economic Policy, 'Nowhere Income" and the Throwback Rule
(Aug. 2011), www.itepnet.org/pdf/pb39throw.pdf; Michal Mazerov, Closing Three
Common Corporate Income Tax Loopholes Could Raise Additional Revenue for




for ensuring that all of a taxpayer's income is subject to tax by at least one
state.
Under a throwback rule for example, a taxpayer's sales are added
back to their sales factor numerator 235 in a state if (1) the taxpayer is not
subject to tax in the state to which the sale would otherwise be sourced and
(2) the item sold originates from the taxing state.236 The effect of a throwback
rule is that the taxpayer's sales are attributed to the state from which the
goods were shipped, rather than the state in which the taxpayer's customer
consumes the goods. The rule thus ensures that "mismatches" between
states' overall substantive jurisdiction and their enforcement jurisdiction do
not arise.237 It does not, however, reflect an increase in the origination state's
enforcement jurisdiction. Throwback rules thus take on an uneasy tone when
pulled into the enforcement jurisdiction inquiry. The purpose of factor nexus
is not to ensure that a taxpayer's income is subject to tax somewhere, but
rather to determine when a taxpayer's connection to a particular state is
sufficient to meet the demands of the Commerce Clause. A throwback rule is
thus unsuited to an economic nexus analysis. Throwing back sales for
purposes of a factor nexus inquiry would improperly source sales to a state
based not upon a taxpayer's actions with respect to that state, but with
respect to another state's jurisdiction to tax. That focus is inappropriate when
attempting to determine the scope of a state's enforcement jurisdiction.
235. A taxpayer's sales factor numerator represents its sales that are
attributable (under the states' particular rules) to the taxing state. State corporate
income taxes make use of apportionment formulae to properly allocate income
among the states in which a taxpayer does business. Historically, states have used
three factors (the property factor, the payroll factor, and the sales factor) to develop
an overall apportionment formula that is applied to the taxpayer's apportionable
income. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 8.05-8.06.
236. For a detailed discussion of throwback rules, see HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION, supra note 16, 9.18[1][b]. The throwback rule is a component of the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA"), a model income tax
act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT (1957). The UDIPTA throwback rule
provides that "[slales of tangible personal property are in this state if... the property
is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other place of storage in this
state and (1) the purchaser is the United States government or (2) the taxpayer is not
taxable in the state of the purchaser. "Id. § 16(b). A taxpayer is deemed to be taxable
in the state of the purchaser if the taxpayer is either "subject to a net income tax, a
franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing
business, or a corporate stock tax" in that state or "that state has jurisdiction to
subject the taxpayer to a net income tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state does
or does not " Id. § 3.
237. See William J. Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax
Purposes, 35 TAXES 747, 747-51 (1957).
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A throwback rule is only one example of how a taxpayer's factors
can be manipulated238 to reflect aspects of its business operations other than
its connection with a particular state. 239 Because the factors are ultimately
subject to state legislative control, factor definitions can be shaped and
changed in myriad ways. 240 That definitional flexibility calls into question
the ability of state quantitative economic nexus standards to provide uniform
or consistent guidance to taxpayers regarding their multi-state tax-
compliance obligations.
3. Application Flexibility
The final weakness of current factor nexus standards is that nothing
prevents states from adopting opt-out provisions like those enacted by the
Ohio and Oklahoma legislatures and by the California Franchise Tax Board.
As discussed above, the Ohio factor nexus provision provides an alternative
rule under which a person has a substantial nexus with the state if the person
"[o]therwise has nexus with the state to an extent that the person can be
required to remit the tax [] under the Constitution of the United States. 241
Oklahoma law similarly allows the state to impose its tax on a business that
"[o]therwise has nexus with this state to an extent that the person can be
required to remit the tax imposed under this act under the Constitution of the
United States. 242 The California Franchise Tax Board has also indicated that
it can assert nexus over a taxpayer if that taxpayer actively engages in
238. "Manipulated" is not used in a pejorative sense. Rather, it merely
refers to the fact that states can change (or customize) their factors to take into
account elements perhaps not previously contemplated or that cause the standard
factor formulation to produce results that were not desired or anticipated.
239. Although the MTC formulation for calculating a taxpayer's sales for
purposes of its factor nexus standard does not include a throwback rule, as show
above in Part II.C.2, states have often relied upon their general apportionment
provisions rather than the MTC's formulation. Most states' general apportionment
provisions contain throwback rules. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note
16, at 9.18[1][b][i].
240. The MTC's model regulations to the UDITPA include both a provision
allowing the use of alternative apportionment formulas "where the apportionment an
allocation provisions contained in Article IV produce incongruous results" and
special rules that modify the normal apportionment rules in specific situations. See
Multistate Tax Comm'n, Allocation and Apportionment Regulations §§ IV.18(a)-(c)
(2010), http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Uniformity/
UniformityProjects/A - Z/AllocaitonandApportionmentReg.pdf. States have
followed suit by adopting special apportionment rules. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX
CODE § 25137 (West 2012); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 560-7-7-.03(5)(e) (2012); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 100.3380(c) (2012).
241. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5751.01(H)(4) (West 2012).
242. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68 § 1218(H)(7) (2012).
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business transactions for profit in the state, regardless of whether those
activities meet the state's factor nexus thresholds.243
These economic nexus "safety valves" undercut any potential for
state-adopted factor nexus to provide uniformity or certainty. A taxpayer that
does not meet a state's prescribed thresholds must still consider whether the
state could argue that it has nexus under some non-defined, qualitative nexus
standard. Application flexibility thus completely undermines the
administrative and commercial benefits of factor nexus and is perhaps the
most damning type of flexibility for state-adopted factor nexus. If factor
nexus is to be accepted as an administrative proxy for economic nexus, states
(just as taxpayers) should be bound to their choice.
4. Summary
The sum of this discussion evidences that factor nexus (in its current
form) does not provide any assurance of a consistent, uniform economic
nexus standard. That approach to economic nexus certainly provides
administrative benefits and may capture a good portion of taxpayers with an
economic nexus in a taxing state. However, state factor nexus standards
simply do not provide any guidance on the constitutional question - when
does an economic nexus rise to the level of a substantial nexus? At best,
those standards provide bright-line rules that create some level of certainty
for states and taxpayers - at least with respect to a single state.244 At worst,
factor nexus represents a flexible system under which states can change and
lower their nexus thresholds at will, requiring taxpayers to undertake a
burdensome review of state standards each year even though their business
activity is unchanged.
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH ECONOMIC NEXUS?
The analysis above demonstrates that states' current economic nexus
formulations are non-uniform, that those formulations lack concrete
foundations, and that there is no direct Supreme Court authority requiring
adherence to their forms. Taxpayers can thus fairly expect that current
economic nexus formulations will change as states evaluate new applications
of the economic nexus construct. Consequently, without a conscious effort to
develop a unified approach to economic nexus, an unacceptable lack of
uniformity and an unacceptable lack of certainty will result. That lack of
uniformity and lack of certainty will create a state tax environment that is
243. See California, General Information, supra note 164.
244. Of course, that certainly is maintained only as long as states do not
change any of the variables that go into the calculation of a taxpayer's factors or
retain the flexibility to assert nexus under other standards as well.
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inconsistent with the purpose of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence - to create structural protections against undue burdens on
interstate commerce. Something must be done. It is no longer sufficient to
discuss the efficacy of economic nexus. The dialog must evolve to more
comprehensively discuss what economic nexus should mean.
A. Potential Approaches for Economic Nexus
In developing the ideal approach to economic nexus, two aspects
must be evaluated: (1) what principles should guide the development of that
approach and (2) who should develop or impose that approach. The answer
to the first dictates the answer to the second. As a principal matter, the
economic nexus "question" is one implicating the core concerns of the
Dormant Commerce Clause - ensuring that state regulation (and
specifically here state taxation) - does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. To those ends, two guiding principles should govern:
uniformity 4 and certainty.246
To the extent that states' rules are uniform, multistate taxpayers bear
little marginal burdens when entering a new market (other than payment of
the tax imposed), and interstate commerce is encouraged.247 In contrast, a
245. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income, supra note 36, at 67
(discussing a desire for a clarified, uniform standard for enforcement jurisdiction);
W. Bartley Hildreth, Matthew N. Murray & David L. Sjoquist, Interstate Tax
Uniformity and the Multistate Tax Commission, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 575, 581 (2005)
("Certainly uniformity of state corporate income taxes would be preferred to non-
uniformity."); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Dfficulty of Getting Serious About State
Corporate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327, 328 (2010) [hereinafter
McLure, The Difficulty] (stating that "an ideal system of state corporate income taxes
would exhibit uniformity in . . . standards for jurisdiction to tax"); McLure &
Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention, supra note 232 (general extolling the
benefits of uniformity).
246. There has been some discussion in recent tax scholarship regarding the
potential benefits of uncertainty within the tax laws. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky,
Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017 (2009).
Cf Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L.
REV. 489 (2011). That discussion generally focuses on the potential
benefits/detriments of uncertainty with respect to substantive tax provisions. The
constitutional and jurisdictional dimensions of the issues discussed herein present a
drastically different question.
247. For an article supporting the notion that the Court's Commerce Clause
concerns about nexus stem from the marginal costs of tax compliance, see generally
David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483 (2012).
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lack of uniformity causes increased burdens on interstate commerce through
increased tax compliance costs.
248
Certainty also significantly reduces the marginal burdens of
compliance. Certainty for these purposes means that a state's nexus rule is
available, easy to apply, and static. Where a state's rule does not meet those
criteria, compliance costs are increased and interstate commerce is
discouraged.
With these two principles in mind, it becomes clear that a federal
"solution" for economic nexus is needed. Parts II.B-C, above, evidence the
lack of uniformity among the states with respect to their economic nexus
formulations. Wide variations already exist among current state standards,
whether in qualitative or quantitative form. Indeed, even the states that have
adopted the MTC's model factor nexus standard have failed to adopt it
uniformly. Further, there is little reason to expect widespread uniform action
among states in the future.249 It is thus clear that state-adopted economic
nexus is highly unlikely to satisfy the goal of uniformity.
248. Sanjey Gupta & Lillian F. Mills, Does Disconformity in State
Corporate Income Tax Systems Affect Compliance Cost Burdens, 56 NAT'L TAX J.
355, 357, 369-70 (2003); see also PricewaterhouseCoopers, Total Tax Contribution:
How Much do Large U.S. Companies Pay in Taxes? (2009), at 5,
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/national-economic-statistics/assets/total tax contribu
tion.pdf (noting that state and local tax compliance costs are more than double the
study participants' federal tax compliance costs per dollar of taxes paid -
suggesting that the lack of uniformity increases compliance costs). Two factors may
mitigate the results of these studies. First, significant technological advances have
certainly reduced compliance costs since the data used in the Gupta study. Second,
the compliance costs in those studies undoubtedly include planning costs that firms
"voluntarily" incur to lower their effective state tax rates. We can debate whether
those costs should be charged to the states or to taxpayers. While those are voluntary
costs in one sense, firms may be required to engage in those activities from a
competitive standpoint. As much as a firm's tax personnel may dislike artificial
state-tax-minimization strategies, the capital markets are not forgiving of lost
opportunities to increase earnings per share.
249. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Understanding the Nuttiness of State Tax
Policy: When States Have Both Too Much Sovereignty and Not Enough, 58 NAT'L
TAX J. 565, 570-72 (2005) [hereinafter McLure, Understanding the Nuttiness]
(discussing the lack of uniform state action on tax matters); State Taxation: The
Impact of Congressional Legislation on State and Local Government Revenues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11 th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Rep. Johnson, Jr., Member, House
Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[T]here has never been an instance where all states have
enacted a uniform tax law. They have gone as far - group states - agreeing to
model uniform tax laws; but a minority of those states have enacted the various
model laws.") The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, for example, has
developed for over a decade, yet only 24 states have adopted its basic structure. The
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State economic nexus formulations also fail to provide any certainty.
First, there is significant uncertainty in states whose courts have simply
approved the concept of economic nexus without defining what it means.
Further, in the states in which standards have been announced, the preceding
analysis suggests that those standards will change and erode over time.
State-adopted economic nexus thus provides little certainty to taxpayers.
The combination of these factors compels the conclusion that
purposeful, proactive action by the Supreme Court or Congress25 ° is
warranted. The question, then, is what the ideal federal approach to
economic nexus would be. There are four main options. First, the Court or
Congress could adopt simple source-based economic nexus and effectively
remove the substantial nexus prong of Complete Auto (at least for purposes
of business activity taxation). Second, the Court or Congress could adopt a
physical presence rule and reject economic nexus altogether. Third, the Court
or Congress could adopt a heightened economic standard based on the
MBNA W. Va. standard. Finally, Congress could adopt a federal factor nexus
standard.2 5'
B. The Appropriate Approach For Economic Nexus
Determining the best formulation for economic nexus requires that
both tax and constitutional policy considerations be taken into account. This
Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, About Us, http://www.streamlined
salestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
250. To be sure, there may be concerns about Congress inserting itself in
such a material way into state affairs. However, two factors mitigate those concerns.
First, the intervention would be purely jurisdictional. A federal formulation would
not change states' substantive tax rules. Rather, it would operate just as the Dormant
Commerce Clause currently operates - as a pure jurisdictional threshold. Second,
Congress has on many occasions promulgated jurisdictional rules for state taxation.
(Perhaps most notably, its enactment of P.L. 86-272. See supra note 42.) States are
even currently turning to Congress to expand their jurisdiction to impose use-tax
collection requirements on remote vendors. See, e.g., Main Street Fairness Act, H.R.
2701, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2011); The Marketplace Equity Act of 2011, H.R.
3179, 112th Cong. (2012). Congress also clearly has the constitutional authority to
enact an economic nexus standard. PAUL J. HARTMAN & CHARLES A. TROST,
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 585-95 (Thompson West
2d ed. 2003); HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 4.23.
251. These options necessarily exclude the option of the Court adopting a
factor nexus standard. The Court simply is not a good body to develop a quantitative
test. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus
Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REv. 343, 364 (2003) (stating that
the Court "is not well-equipped to make quantitative distinctions"); HELLERSTEIN,
STATE TAXATION, supra note 16, 8.09[4][c] (stating that "[liegislatures are far
better equipped than courts to establish quantitative standards").
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is not only a tax issue, but a Commerce Clause (and hence commercial) issue
as well. The determination of the ideal approach for economic nexus should
thus be guided by the formulation that can best serve both masters. An
evaluation of each proposal follows with that framework in mind.
1. Source-Based Economic Nexus
The first option discussed above was for the Supreme Court or
Congress to adopt source-based economic nexus. That option would serve
the goal of aligning states' enforcement and substantive jurisdiction and
would perhaps best serve good tax policy.2 However, the absence of a de
minimis rule in a pure source-based standard likely makes that approach the
least palatable option from a constitutional perspective. Recall that the
Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is driven by concerns
about the effects of state taxation on interstate commerce. Subjecting
businesses to a state's tax regime based on the generation of minimal
amounts of revenue from within that state would severely implicate that
concern. For example, no business could operate on the Internet without
opening itself to taxation in any (or every) state.253 This failure counsels
heavily against the adoption of pure source-based economic nexus. 4
2. A Physical Presence Standard
The second option would be for the Court or Congress to reject
economic nexus and to adopt a physical presence rule. From a constitutional
perspective, this option has merit. A bright-line physical presence rule would
provide clear guidance to taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce and
252. See Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income, supra note 36, at 47-49
(discussing two possible "solutions" to the misalignment of states' substantive and
enforcement jurisdiction); Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra
note 7, at 374-393 (discussing these issues and noting that the "next step" in this
area "would be a rule providing that if there is nexus with the income (i.e., if the
income is apportionable to the state), then there is nexus with the taxpayer."). "Good
tax policy" in this instance means that states have the power to tax all income over
which they have substantive jurisdiction. That construct ensures that all income is
subject to tax somewhere and that taxation does not depend on the type of commerce
or corporate structure that generated that income.
253. Of course, Due Process considerations might counsel otherwise.
254. In advocating for source-based nexus, John Swain has noted that
exceptions would be needed in two situations: (1) where taxation would violate the
Due Process Clause and (2) where a taxpayer's income attributable to the state is de
minimis. Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 390-91.
The recognition of a need for a de minimis rule highlights the constitutional concerns
raised by pure source-based nexus.
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reduce litigation regarding the scope of state power. Businesses would not
only save money by reducing their tax and return-preparation costs, but they
would also save money by not having to research and evaluate as many as
fifty different state standards.155 A physical presence would thus provide the
same benefits that the Quill Court noted with its enunciation of that rule for
state sales and use taxes.256
Of course, where the physical presence rule shines for constitutional
purposes, it is remarkably dull from a tax-policy perspective. Again, good
tax policy would ensure that states have the power to collect tax on all of the
income over which they have substantive jurisdiction.257 Good tax policy
does not allow for "nowhere income" (which results from a disconnect
between substantive and enforcement jurisdictions) or a preference between
types of economic actors (whether operating in tangible or digital form).
Reliance on a physical presence rule would violate those ideals by preventing
states from taxing income over which they had substantive jurisdiction and
by ensuring that taxpayers that exploited a market through electronic or other
non-physical means would have an advantage over those who did so
physically. That standard would continue to exalt form over substance and
place greater strains on state resources without a compelling policy
justification. Consequently, although that standard might serve the goals of
the Commerce Clause admirably, its failure to comport with good tax policy
counsels against its adoption.258
255. Assuming, of course, that all fifty states determined to implement a
business activity tax.
256. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1992) (noting
that the artificiality of bright-line tests is "more than offset by the benefits of a clear
rule," including "firmly establish[ing] the boundaries of state authority . . . and
reduc[ing] litigation").
257. See supra note 252.
258. See McLure, Understanding the Nuttiness, supra note 249, at 569-70
(discussing how P.L. 86-272 is an example of Congress poorly legislating state tax
policy); McLure & Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention, supra note 232, at 734-
35 (noting the "opportunities for tax planning" and the revenue loss created by P.L.
86-272); Swain, A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 393
("But good tax policy demands more. Congress should repeal P.L. 86-272. Its safe
harbors have no place in a modem economy."). Cf Marjorie Gell, Broken Silence:
Congressional Inaction, Judicial Reaction, and the Need for a Federally Mandated
Physical Presence Standard for State Business Activity Taxes, 6 PITT. TAX. REv. 99,
119-29 (2009) (discussing economic, constitutional, administrative, and systematic




3. A Qualitative Economic Nexus Standard
The third option would be for the Court or Congress to adopt a
qualitative economic nexus formulation in the form of the MBNA W. Va. test.
From a tax-policy perspective, that option would be favorable because it
would finally establish the validity of economic nexus. As discussed above,
however, such a standard would improperly elevate physical contacts over
259
economic contacts. It would thus artificially limit economic nexus and
would be internally inconsistent.
From a constitutional standpoint, a heightened, qualitative economic
nexus standard would serve the goals of the Commerce Clause by protecting
taxpayers from taxation in remote states unless they had significant
economic presences in those states. Businesses considering expanding their
marketing or distribution could thus do so without fear that their tax-
compliance costs will outweigh their economic returns from that expansion.
Despite those benefits, however, the soft, qualitative language of such a
standard would invite continued controversy between taxpayers and taxing
authorities and would not be easy to administer.260 Those debates would
ultimately generate the same litigation that is occurring today, and the Court
would be solicited repeatedly to review that standard. Given the Court's
general lack of interest in reviewing cases under the physical presence
261
standard, it is reasonable to assume that it would have a similar lack of
interest in reviewing cases under a federal, qualitative economic nexus
standard. The adoption of such a standard would thus lead, again, to
significant debate and uncertainty unless Congress intervened to provide
guidance.
In sum, a federal, qualitative standard for economic nexus would
only marginally represent good tax policy, would fall short of providing
adequate guidance for taxpayers, and would unnecessarily burden interstate
commerce. That approach is consequently not ideal under either of the
relevant benchmarks.
259. See supra Part HI.A.3.
260. Charles McLure recognized this point in initially proposing a factor
nexus standard. McLure, Implementing, supra note 10, at 1296 ("It would not be
satisfactory merely to specify in general terms that 'significant amounts' of in-state
payroll, property, or sales would be required for nexus; that leaves too much
uncertainty and too much room for litigation."). It is also worth recognizing that
disputes under a federal qualitative standard would naturally result in different state
interpretations of the uniform federal standard. A lack of uniformity would again
commence.
261. See supra Part II.B. 1 (listing a long line of cases in which the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari over state tax jurisdiction cases).
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4. Factor Nexus Legislation
The final option listed above would be for Congress to exercise its
authority under the Commerce Clause and to adopt federal factor nexus
legislation.262 This option would be desirable from a constitutional
perspective for two reasons. First, it would pay due accord to the goals of the
Commerce Clause by providing a de facto de minimis rule through its
minimum nexus thresholds. Consequently, businesses could expand their
marketing efforts into new states without worrying that their marginal costs
of tax compliance will exceed their monetary benefits from exploiting those
markets .26 3
Additionally, from a constitutional policy perspective, the adoption
of a federal "rule" rather than a "standard" would be appropriate in this area.
While there has been vigorous debate regarding the benefits of rules versus
standards, 64 the concerns of the Commerce Clause counsel towards a clear,
bright-line rule. As the Quill court noted, a bright-line rule "firmly
establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority . . . and reduces
litigation., 26' The Court lauded such a rule because its law in the area of state
taxation has been "something of a 'quagmire' and the 'application of
constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for
controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guidelines to the
States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation. 2 66 Bright-line
rules also "encourage[] settled expectations and, in doing so, foster[]
investment by businesses and individuals" - core concerns underlying the
Dormant Commerce Clause.267  Federal factor nexus (appropriately
structured) would provide all of those benefits.268
262. A proper starting point for such legislation would be the MTC model
discussed above. See supra Part III.C.1. A concomitant repeal of P.L. 86-272 would
be ideal. That artificial limitation on states' jurisdiction to tax would be inconsistent
with the recognition of a federal economic nexus standard.
263. This assumes, of course, that the thresholds are set appropriately.
264. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379
(1985) (discussing the perceived benefits and detriments of rules and
standards); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the
Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1214 (2010) (discussing the potential
benefits of standards over rules); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF.
L. REv. 953 (1995) (discussing potential weaknesses with rules).
265. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
266. Id. at 315-16.
267. Id. at 316.
268. Implicit in this discussion is that a federal factor nexus standard would
provide standard definitions for determining taxpayers' factors. That mandatory
uniformity would alleviate the undue burdens created by a system that requires
taxpayers to determine their tax obligations by applying a multiplicity of different
2012]
Florida Tax Review
A federal factor nexus standard would also further good tax policy
by relying on source principles rather than on artificial distinctions between
economic and physical presences. The factor nexus thresholds could be set
sufficiently low to avoid the conceptual problems that heightened economic
nexus standards present.2 69 Most importantly, federal factor nexus would
eliminate nexus variability among states.270 As discussed above, even among
states that have adopted factor nexus standards, those standards are not
uniform. They also have three weaknesses that effectively foreclose their
potential for obtaining that uniformity: states' flexibility with respect to the
magnitude of those thresholds, the uncertainty and flexibility with respect to
how sales are actually sourced, and states' adoptions of opt-out provisions to
those standards. 27' A federal factor nexus standard would solve each of those
problems while serving the same policy goals.
The federal solution would eliminate magnitude variability because
the magnitude of the factor threshold amounts would be set by Congress, and
could only be changed through deliberation and debate at a national level.
Further, that legislation would eliminate definitional flexibility by providing
uniform apportionment rules (for purposes of the nexus determination).
nexus rules. States would still be free, however, to apply their own apportionment
formulae. There is no inherent need to unify a taxpayer's factors for purposes of
nexus determinations and for purposes of apportioning their income.
This is different than the proposals of the Willis Committee and of Charles
McLure. They each note the inherent inconsistency in using one rule for nexus
purposes and another for apportionment purposes. H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, pt. 1, at
485-87 (1964); McLure, Implementing, supra note 10, at 1297. While there is truth
to their concerns, I believe that the need for a uniform nexus standard counsels
towards as light of a touch as necessary. By adopting a broad economic nexus
standard and allowing states to adopt their own apportionment formulae, states retain
more flexibility and can reduce incidences of nowhere income to the greatest extent
possible.
269. As previously discussed, heightened economic nexus standards have
artificially limited scopes so as to avoid the appearance of overbreadth.
270. John Swain has also recently offered factor nexus as the preferred
standard for addressing economic nexus. John A. Swain, Misalignment of
Substantive and Enforcement Jurisdiction in a Mobile Economy: Causes and
Strategies for Realignment, 63 NAT'L TAx. J. 925, 941 (2010) [hereinafter Swain,
Causes & Strategies] (advocating for factor nexus standards as the ideal approach to
factor nexus); see also Quinn T. Ryan, Note, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About
State Corporate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 275, 307-20 (2010)
(proposing a federal adoption of factor nexus and uniform apportionment rules). The
major difference between Professor Swain's approach and that considered herein is
that this Article advocates for a federal factor nexus standard. As described in the
text, a federal standard would provide the uniformity and certainty that state factor
nexus standards do not provide.
271. See supra Part HI.B.
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Finally, federal factor nexus would eliminate application flexibility by
precluding states from adopting opt-out rules. The federal standard would be
mandatory and exclusive.
Of course, this discussion assumes that a federal factor nexus
standard would provide uniform thresholds for all states. This may seem
problematic at first blush because it seems to ignore the very real differences
between states' markets - $250,000 of sales into Wyoming is very different
than $250,000 of sales into New York. This issue, like others, deserves to be
considered in further scholarship. However, uniform standards for all states
would be sensible. Interstate commerce is burdened if the costs of
compliance overwhelm a taxpayer's returns from a state, regardless of the
size of the market. Thus, the magnitude of the federal factors should be set at
the point at which a taxpayer's returns from a state can be reasonably
expected to overcome its costs of compliance with the state's income tax
laws. A focus on market sizes is irrelevant to that question. If "indexing" the
threshold amounts were desirable, the more compelling basis would be the
level of complexity of that state's income tax (or perhaps its level of
divergence from a standard system like the UDITPA). Of course, if a federal
factor nexus standard were considered, Congress would resolve these issues
with adequate input and guidance from the relevant constituencies.
In sum, federal factor nexus presents the option for economic nexus
that would best serve both good tax and constitutional policy goals.2 72 It
would recognize the legitimacy of economic nexus without artificially
limiting its scope and would provide a clear, uniform rule with built in de
minimis protection.273 Without more then, this Article could conclude.
272. Once the idea of a federal factor nexus standard is accepted as worthy,
a number of secondary issues would need to be considered. Do the property and
payroll factors maintain relevance? Should certain industries have different
formulations? These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but they deserve to
be explored in further scholarship.
273. As noted at the outset, this proposal would also be consistent (in large
part) with the recommendations of other prominent state tax scholars. See, e.g.,
McLure, Implementing, supra note 10, at 1295-97; Swain, A Jurisprudential and
Policy Perspective, supra note 7, at 390-93; Swain, Causes & Strategies, supra note
270, at 941. See also Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Nexus Requirements for
Imposition of Business Activity Taxes (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.nysba.org/
AMiTemplate.cfm?Section=TaxSectionReports_2008&TEMPLATE=/CM/Cont
entDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=13360 (proposing a federal economic nexus
standard that contains de minis thresholds). Of course, the proposal offered herein is
different than prior proposals for two reasons. First, as previously noted, John Swain
has advocated for factor nexus at the state level rather than at a federal level. Second,
Charles McLure and others have proposed wider-reaching federal intervention that
would include federal apportionment rules, for example. The proposal herein is thus
more and less restrictive than prior proposals.
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Congress could implement this proposal and clear the muddy waters. Of
course, the world is not that simple, and several obstacles stand in the way of
a federal factor nexus standard.274
The principal obstacle to the adoption of a federal factor nexus
standard is that such a standard would not be ideal for either of the two
constituencies that it would most directly impact - states and the business
community. States would naturally prefer to retain their current (essentially
unfettered) power, and business would prefer a physical presence rule.275
Outside of a few interested academics, then, Congress is unlikely to find
much support for extending its hand in this way. Not since the adoption of
P.L. 86-272 in 1959 has Congress passed such expansive state tax
legislation, and it is unlikely to do so without a request from at least one of
the major interested parties.
As an additional complication, state tax nexus is as much of a
political issue as it is a tax-policy issue. For those who believe that a physical
presence rule currently governs, a federal factor nexus rule would be branded
a tax increase (and a tax increase that did not inure to the benefit of
Congress).276 On the other hand, to states that believe that a federal factor
nexus standard would limit their power, such a bill could be construed as
another unfunded mandate stretching state resources. Each of these
constructs is less than palatable for Congress.
The only realistic possibility that federal factor nexus has for
enactment appears to be for the business community and states to adopt a
unified front and to approach Congress to intervene. That unity would have
to be fostered through serious discussion regarding the current state of the
law and the potential benefits that a federal standard would provide. States
would have to give up sovereign control of their standards in favor of a clear
directive from Congress to taxpayers. That directive (in the form of factor
nexus) would allow states to retain a significant level of power and would
prevent states from having to litigate threshold economic nexus disputes in
perpetuity. On the other side of the debate, taxpayers would have to abandon
hope of a physical presence rule in favor of uniformity and a satisfactory de
minimis rule. This will perhaps become more palatable as more states adopt
broad economic nexus standards.
274. See McLure, The Difficulty, supra note 245, at 338 (explaining why
federal action on apportionment and nexus issues is unlikely).
275. Currently, Congress has before it a bill that would extend the
protections of P.L. 86-272 to all vendors, whether of tangible personal property,
intangible personal property, or services. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act
of 2011, H.R. 1439, 112th Cong. (2011). That bill would provide business with the
broad-reaching physical presence standard that it has sought for years.
276. Expanded state tax power would actually reduce federal revenues due




The other potential room for agreement between states and the
business community would be as part of a "package deal" on nexus for
purposes of state sales and use taxes. As noted above, Quill currently
imposes a physical presence rule for purposes of sales and use taxes. The
losses to states from that rule have been estimated to be over ten billion
dollars annually.2 77 To the extent that the physical presence rule for purposes
of state sales and use taxes protects a smaller subset of vendors than those
that suffer from uncertainty or continued debate regarding economic nexus
for purposes of business activity taxes, it may be possible to form an alliance
of interests among business and states. If business feels that economic nexus
is here to stay, and that states' standards will be either unduly broad or
uncertain, it may be willing to support a repudiation of Quill in exchange for
federal factor nexus. States will be less inclined to make that deal, of course,
if they feel that Quill is not on firm footing. However, given the current lack
of interest by the Court and the lack of agreement in Congress in dealing
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with these nexus issues, a reversal of Quill does not seem imminent. 78 On
the other hand, the revenue losses from the physical presence rule are current
and very real. States accordingly may be willing to give some ground on
economic nexus to see Quill abandoned once and for all. Finally, Congress
could force compromise by refusing to adopt a bill addressing sales tax
nexus unless that legislation included rules for business activity taxes as
well. That approach would surely frustrate states, but might be the quickest
way for Congress to resolve these issues. Congress should consider whether
it wants to use the current momentum on sales tax nexus to encourage
resolution of both issues in one fell swoop.
None of this is to say that compromise is likely in the short term.
However, it will never happen if the dialogue regarding economic nexus
does not evolve. For too long, the discussion has centered on the threshold
issue of whether economic nexus is permissible. That focus has resulted in a
multiplicity of varied standards that fail to provide the certainty or uniformity
required by the Dormant Commerce Clause. It is time for states, the business
277. See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local
Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NoTES 537, 540 (May 18,
2009) (projecting losses of $11.4 billion in 2011).
278. There has been recent optimism regarding the likelihood of a
Congressional reversal of Quill as the House Judiciary Committee evaluates a new
proposal - Marketplace Equity Act of 2011. H.R. 3179, 112th Cong. (2011). Laura
Saunders, Online Sales Tax is Coming!, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2012, at B9. However,
it is unclear whether that legislation will gain traction in the near future. John Buhl,
US. House Panel Undecided on Remote Sales Tax Legislation, 65 ST. NoTES 299,
299-301 (July 30, 2012). This bill may fare the same as previous bills attempting to
achieve similar ends. Of course, to the extent that this bill is either passed (or gains
significant support), business's ability to use Quill as a bargaining chip for a federal
factor nexus standard would be eliminated.
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community, the tax bar, and tax scholars to turn their attentions to
developing a satisfactory federal factor nexus standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Economic nexus is a doctrine that has no precise formulation. State
courts adopting that standard have either ignored its boundaries or have
adopted heightened standards that have questionable bases and that are
subject to significant erosion. State legislatures have adopted more
satisfactory approaches, but those standards will also be subject to erosion
and will create undue compliance burdens on multi-state enterprises.
Ultimately, then, the idea that "economic nexus" currently means something
is illusory, and the Supreme Court or Congress will be required to intervene.
A federal factor nexus standard is the most appropriate method for
addressing economic nexus in a way that pays proper attention to both tax
and constitutional policy considerations. At the very least, the discourse in
this area should evolve to discussing how that standard should be formulated
and how to achieve that goal. The current approach of simply adopting ad
hoc economic nexus formulations cannot continue.
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